Tuition fees

 

             I expect the Coalition will win the vote this afternoon on tuition fees. I have been asked for my thoughts on the policy.

               Dr Cable’s package is not the policy I would have designed myself, but I think it preferable to Labour’s alternative of a graduate tax. A graduate tax would drive more able people away from the UK, leaving those higher paid who stay paying a higher Income Tax rate than the 50% already imposed. It would truly be a tax on knowledge, and would not help the universities or encourage better choices by students in the way the Cable scheme will do.

                   I have pressed for more University independence, and for better access funds and scholarships. I wish to see more scholarships for able students of whatever financial background, as well as access funds for those from lower income families. I will vote for the proposals reluctantly, as I dislike the main alternative more.

Mr Redwood’s contribution to the European Union Bill, 7 Dec 2010

Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con): This Bill is born of a very serious mood in our country. A majority of people in Britain feel that a great amount of power has already passed to the European Union over the past 20 years, and they feel that powers are still drifting away under this new Government. They would like to see that progress arrested, and they would like to see powers brought back in certain crucial areas. They would like to feel that more of their lives were under democratic, accountable government here in Westminster than under the less accountable, less democratic government of the European Union. The Government would be wise to heed the seriousness of that view among many in this Parliament, representing many outside it.

I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s noble aim. He says that the aim of his legislation and policy is to give us all a greater sense of empowerment when it comes to matters of European governance and action. I would urge him to look again at his Bill, however. It is certainly cleverly contrived, and it is certainly contrived in a great deal of detail, but it is, in practice, the not-the-referendum Bill. On every area of competence and power that we see drifting away or being transferred from us as we have this debate, we are told, “That would not qualify for a referendum under this legislation.”

I believe that the Foreign Secretary has taken legal advice, and he wants to have a referendum on the transfer of competences rather than on the transfer of powers. I would suggest that that is a tad too clever. We all know that most of the competences have already gone. That was what Lisbon was all about. That was why he and I fought tooth and nail, together, against that treaty and in favour of a referendum on the treaty. Most of the things that the Government now wish to do are a shared competence with the European Union. What matters is not a further transfer of competence, but a further grab or transfer of power by the European authorities.

When the Conservatives were in office, we made it very clear that we wanted trading relationships and friendships, and a certain amount of common legislating in single market and related areas, but not a common Government or political union. To reflect that, the architecture that we persuaded the partners to accept had the third pillar areas of foreign affairs and home affairs, which were matters for independent sovereign states to decide, and we always preserved the veto on any common action. That has now been eroded. So, as we meet to debate the so-called referendum lock, we see powers on home affairs being surrendered, issue by issue, by this Government-as they were by the previous Government-which will result in a much more common criminal jurisdiction from the European level. The British people need a voice on that matter; they need to be asked about it. Some of them might even agree with it, but they want to be treated seriously, as grown-ups, and asked if that is how they want their country to be run in the future.

On foreign affairs, we are being told as we meet that we still have a veto on the big issues and that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary can play his part in shaping a common European action and diplomatic strategy. At the very same time as we have to cut severely the growth rate of our public spending and make some deep cuts in certain areas, which we do not like, we see the European budget going up rapidly, partly to finance a big expansion in the European diplomatic service. This is not being done in order to have holidays in the sun, as some national newspapers seem to suggest, but because the EU wishes to exercise power and authority on our behalf and on behalf of other member states.

Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con): I do not think that the Foreign Office has fully understood the consequences of encouraging this to go ahead, which is what it did. I am afraid that a great many of us voted for it in this House. The European External Action Service is ordering much more expensive cars, is going to have grander embassies and is going to pay much higher salaries than our own diplomatic service. That will be to the detriment of our diplomatic service because it will attract the talent away from our service and towards the European External Action Service.

Mr Redwood: It means that when a British Foreign Secretary makes foreign visits, he or she will be kept waiting while the EU ambassador is received and considered because the latter will speak with more authority on behalf of more people and more states.

It is the third area that we have always reserved for national veto and national competence-central economic policy making-to which I shall address the remainder of my brief remarks in this truncated debate. Literally as we meet here this afternoon, crucial and massive issues are being hammered out in secret around the Council table in Brussels. Quite likely to be on the agenda is the issue of European sovereign bonds and the effective creation of a European sovereign in financial matters that issues debt and guarantees debt on behalf of member states. Do we want that? Are we in it? Is it not a transfer of power if we go along with it? Is it not an issue on which we should be invited to express our views?

Another item on the agenda may be the future membership of the euro. The Council could be considering in secret whether all member states are able to stay in the euro and whether the strong or the weak members should leave. If they are to keep the euro area together, what will be the arrangements for the large transfer payments that need to be made if the single currency is to have some hope of a decent life in the future, as all successful single currency areas have much bigger transfers of tax revenues, subsidies and money around them than the euro area currently does?

Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con): My right hon. Friend portrays so accurately the realities that lie behind this Bill, which is about the economic crisis in Europe as well as many other matters. Does he agree that one serious current problem is the financial stability mechanisms and that if we do not assert our rights in this House and make certain that the courts cannot get their hands on an interpretation that would go the other way, we could end up paying for other countries beyond Ireland-Portugal, Spain and others?

Mr Redwood: My hon. Friend is absolutely right, which is why the transfer of power, if not of competence, is such a crucial issue and why we need to engage in a public debate at this very moment about how far this should go.

I hasten to stress to the House-particularly to my critics, who like to misconstrue what I say-that I wish our partners every success and prosperity with their single currency. I know that if that is the way they choose to run their economies, it is in our interests for it to work. We want them to be happier and more prosperous, and we like to benefit from trading with them, just as they like selling us a lot of their products. My worry is that in the process of our enthusiasm for that, we will draw in Britain-with her rather stretched budgets, even after the changes that the Government have rightly and wisely made-at a time when we do not have the financial strength to go to the aid of all these other euroland countries that are in some difficulty under the euro scheme.

I am a critic of the Irish loan. Of course I do not want to see the Irish economy go down, but I do not happen to think that lending the country lots of money at that juncture, as a result of a crisis deliberately created by the European Central Bank, was a terribly good way to behave. I do not believe that if Britain had declined to make some money available, the Irish loan would not have been negotiated. It would have been negotiated quite successfully by the architects of it-the powers behind the European Central Bank, who literally decided to withdraw funds from the Irish banks at a difficult time and made that decision public, thereby precipitating the crisis. We were engaged in a refinancing package for the European Central Bank. I think we should be told the truth; we should be told why it was a good idea for a country that rightly stayed out of the euro because it did not want the financial risk and hassle, to be drawn into helping finance the consequences of an ill-judged currency without a political union.

A successful currency needs a sovereign to love it and support it. That is why the sovereign’s face traditionally appears on the coinage and why there has to be a symbol to show that the whole weight of legal and economic authority stands behind a currency. If Europe is to have a successful euro, she needs a sovereign. I do not want my country to be part of the euro, and I think that around 80% of the British people agree with me. I think that even Opposition Members temporarily agree with me on this issue; they are not rushing to say that now is a good time to join the euro. We should be open and honest with the British people and say, “We wish the euro well”. We are doing it a great favour by not trying to join it-we would have been an over-mighty subject in it, which might even had led to it toppling earlier-and we are not currently in a financial position to make all the transfer payments available that are necessary for full members of a single currency area.

The House needs to understand that while we are debating some abstruse language and pledging this and future Governments to hold a referendum on treaties unknown about competences unspecified, a potentially massive transfer of power is under way yet again from the member states to the centre. There has to be; the thing cannot work without more central power behind the banks and the economic institutions.

The British Government say that they will accept a treaty extending the centralising powers in the economic sphere because the penalties on these will not apply to the UK Government. Well, I am delighted that the penalties will not apply, but I see no reason why the requirements should apply either, because we are not part of the euro. We should offer our support for a strengthening of economic governance for the euro area alone and make it clear that all the regulations and the directives apply only to that area. I think that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary got it wrong when he said that none of these apply to Britain; several of them do, although without the ultimate penalties. There could be other penalties, incidentally, which might apply to Britain.

When we surrender our veto and allow this treaty to go through on that condition-that it applies only to euroland-we should say that we want something back.

We should seek to establish that we believe the European Union already has too much power and that we want something back. Do we want our fisheries back; do we want control over our borders back; do we want control over elements of taxation that have already gone to Europe through common taxation and a series of court judgments?

Power is seeping away as we meet. A massive debate is under way. Will the Government please take this Parliament and the British people into their confidence? Will they take us seriously? Will they give us an adult debate on the reality rather than this show Bill?

The debate on the EU bill

 

             Yesterday’s debate on the EU was lively. The strong view from most on the Conservative benches was the same – we want effective  action to curb any more  powers going to Brussels, and get powers back. The Bill places a “referendum lock” on the transfer of new competences, but it does not tackle the immediate issues of more powers going to regulate business, bail out the Euro, strengthen economic governance, build a stronger EU diplomatic service and increase EU Criminal Justice powers. My speech in the  debate appears under “Debates” on this site for those  interested.

Public sector cost reduction

 

              In 2007-8 I started to draw attention to the need for the public sector to do more for less. I pointed out that spending was rising too quickly and not always being well spent.

              The costs of running my Parliamentary office and my expenses cost the taxpayer £105,917 in 2007-8. There were 23 MPs who did the job for less taxpayer cost, so I said I would cut my costs by 10% in 2008-9 and by another 10% in 2009-10. The two year cost reduction programme would take the total annual costs down to £85,792. I wished to show that you can cut costs in the public sector without damaging service levels.

              I have recently been sent the figures for 2009-10 by the Commons Authorities. They will publish the details in February 2011. The total costs I incurred in running the office and my own expenses came to £75,015 in 2009-10. That was £10,000 more off  than the target reductions and represents a decline of 29% compared to 2007-8. It would be more in inflation adjusted real terms, used in many public sector budgets.  £60,420 within the total was staff cost.

Currency unions usually fail – success only comes if they form a new country

 

                  There has been some surprise expressed that someone from the Office of Budget Responsibility confessed that monetary unions usually  fail. The correct statement is monetary unions usually fail, unless they help drive the creation of a new or united country. The US monetary union and the German monetary union were part of the federal constructions in those two emerging countries in the nineteenth century. The Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian monetary unions failed, because those countries did not complete or maintain political union.                   

                  The Latin currency union was created in 1865 by France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. Other countries joined later. The absence of a Central Bank and central monetary authority, the decision of the Papal See to issue devalued silver coins, the gap between silver and gold prices, and finally states’ borrowing needs for the First World War broke the Union, which was effectively ended by the War and given the last rites in 1927.

                     The Scandinavian currency union of Sweden, Denmark and Norway lasted from 1875 to 1914, with common banknotes from 1901.  The termination of Sweden and Norway’s politcal union in 1905, followed by the demands of war finance,  killed the monetary union.

                      Ireland’s monetary union with the UK was ended  on 30 March 1979. Ireland enjoyed a freely floating currency against sterling until entry into the Euro in 1999.

Euro trick or treat?

 

             Finance Ministers are considering what further steps they need to take to tackle Europe’s debts and deficits, and wayward currency union. It is time to review the options that face them.

1. Germany leaves the Euro, recreating the DM. The other countries would devalue against Germany. easing some of the trading tensions and imbalances. The smaller Eurio zone would take stronger powers to control debt and deficits. They would still need to fix the banks.

2. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain leave the Euro. They would devalue, and have to sort out their own deficit problems more quickly to reassure markets and allow them to borrow at lower rates.  They might need more help or some help from the IMF. The individual states would have to act as gurantors of their leading banks where needed.

3. The peripheral countries persuade the Euro authorities to buy in more of their bonds to get the interest rates down, and to print more Euros to allow some devaluation of the common currency. In return the stronger countries take more control over borrowing and debt totals for all Euro members.

4. The German scheme of demanding more haircuts for bond holders in over borrowed countries and poorly financed banks prevails. The EU quickly enters the next phase of the Euro crisis, with market attacks on other countries and banks leading to bigger guarantees and ECB intervention. More powers are taken in the centre to control debt and deficits, but the rules are rapidly broken to allow bail outs.

5. The European authorities rapidly come of age, agreeing to issue more EU sovereign debts. The member countries have to accept more common taxation, more transfer payments around the Union, and mutual guarantees of the EU debt.  The EU develops a proper financial government, with central decisions on how much common debt to issue and where to spend the money raised.

More prisons or fewer prisoners?

 

             I attended a fascinating seminar in Oxford on Saturday evening about whether the prison population could be safely reduced. Let me share some of the thoughts and facts with you which emerged, on a topic where I claim no expertise.

               We were told that between 1918 and 1939 the prison population averaged around 10,000. Only 1,000 prisoners were in for more than four years.  Today the prison population in England and Wales is around 88,000. 37,000 are in for more than four years or for an indeterminate sentence.   11,367 prisoners were foreign nationals in March 2010, more than the typical inter war total of all prisoners. 

                   72% of the male prisoners are said to be suffering from two or more mental disorders, 66%  used drugs in the previous year and 67% were unemployed before prison.   Half are scarcely literate and have no qualifications. More than 3% of the male prison population is said to be ex servicemen.

                    At the same time as witnessing a surge in prison sentences there has been a large reduction in the use of fines. These roughly halved from 1992 to 2009.  At any given time around 7,500 are serving sentences of under one year. 61% of these will be reconvicted within one year of release.

                     No-one can be pleased with the social portrait these figures reveal. The country does not behave well towards ex servicemen, often leaving them without homes and jobs to go on discharge from the services, and with little support or back up to help them adjust to civilian life. We do not manage to treat enough drug users before their addiction becomes chronic and leads to other crimes to support their habit. Short sentences are too short to train, improve or reform criminals serving them, but often add to  the difficulty for the criminal  finding home and job by legal means on leaving prison.

                          Between 1992 and 2009 violent and sexual crimes, the most serious crimes, remained fairly constant in numbers. Burglary halved, whilst drug offences more than doubled. The anatomy of the prison population tells us that we need to be much tougher and more successful at getting people off drugs and getting people into lawful employment. Of course the electorate  expects long custodial sentences for criminals who have committed serious crimes and repreesent a further threat to the public. For others, surely we want prevention or punishment that suits the crime and makes re-offending less likely, not a racing certainty.

So the Lib Dems are split three ways

 

          It is not that unusual for MPs in a governing party or coalition to be split three ways. Many votes have some government MPs voting against and some abstaining.

           What is unusual is for Ministers to be contemplating abstaining on their own policies! Indeed, that is against the rules. As I understood the Coalition Agreement,  the provision to allow Lib Dems to abstain on tuition fees only kicked in if Coalition Ministers could not reach agreement on the topic. As they demonstrably did reach agreement, around the proposals of a senior Lib Dem, there should be no question of Lib Dem Ministers abstaining. They are bound by collective responsibility.

         Coalition MPs are regularly divided over the issue of the EU. We have seen up to 37 Conservatives vote against – on the issue of the EU budget – and more abstain. Within the government there are also important differences of view. The Hagueites seem to want to give more powers to the EU, proposing the expansion of the diplomatic service, expansion of Criminal Justice powers and accepting a new Treaty to strengthen economic governance. The sceptics, like Liam Fox, Owen Paterson and Iain Duncan Smith presumably disagree with this approach and should be fighting to resist it from within the government.

             It is entirely healthy that there are disagreements within Cabinet over  big issues, and disagreements with the backbenches. What is the point of Cabinet government and Parliament if there we are not allowed to disagree and debate?  There has been a healthy debate on tuition fees, and doubtless some Lib  Dems will stick with the view they put to the electorate in May. Their Ministers have moved on and proposed a new policy to the government which it has accepted . It is now their duty to vote it through.

Does the Uk know how to sell into the modern world?

 

                     If I had sent a sales force with a good new product to sell in 21 countries of the world I would have been very disappointed if they came  back with just one success. I would have been  even more worried, if the target was to sell to 12.

                       The recent discovery that only one overseas Fifa voter backed the UK World Cup proposal  goes alongside the news that we still sell more to Ireland than to India, Brazil and  China combined. We have to ask what don’t we understand about the modern world?

                          Let us assume in the case of Fifa that their stated reasons for our failure were true. We hear they wanted  newer territory to take football to. We understand they like bids with plenty of new construction and a great legacy from all the work. What had happened to our market research? Such a brief meant either we should not compete, as it was not for us, or it meant a different vision for any UK bid. Why didn’t our bid concentrate on how we would spread the word, sell the tickets and the passion around the globe and make the World Cup relevant for countries without a great football heritage? Why didn’t we offer to  harness some of the future  huge UK Overseas Aid budget for football related projects in poorer countries as a central part of the bid?

                 Taking the wider problem  of how we export more, there are the questions of whether we make the right cars, machinery and electronic products for developing markets. If we do, are we good at explaining and adapting them to different conditions? Clearly some of our best companies do, and are very successful exporters.Overall the results still are a long way off the pace.  

                   We also need  to discuss the issue of inducements. Sensible British business people know the UK has a tough law against bribery and uphold it in all their dealings . This was extended in 2002 to include making a UK business person responsible for the action of any independent business agent working for them in an overseas territory. As there are some overseas countries where incentives or personal favours to the purchaser are more common  it means there are  territories where any law abiding UK business person is wise to avoid, or expects to fail with some of their straight forward inducement free offers. Is this true of the UK’s leading competitors? Where do sensible client entertaining, explanatory trips and seminars and free samples end, and unreasonable personal benefits for a customer begin?

Why a currency needs a sovereign

(This post was written for Citywire and adapted for this site)

Many readers of this site think the best answer to resolve the Euro crisis would be to announce the intention to re-establish independent currencies across Europe. They could each find their own level and economies would start to improve.   This is not about to happen because the Euro is a political project. The fact that it does economic damage does not matter very much to its creators. That is why they will instead make more moves to create an economic government of Euroland, and have to do so.

Every successful currency has a sovereign to take care of it. The Euro is an orphan currency. It is a currency in search of a country to love it. Given the rolling sovereign debt crisis in Euroland, and a smouldering banking crisis, it is time to ask will someone be a good parent to this struggling adolescent money?

Traditionally sovereigns placed their stamp on the money and placed their force, their Treasury  and economic policy behind it. The sovereign decided how much to issue and whether to debase it.

Modern democracies behave in a similar way, though they often use a so called independent Central Bank to make some of the important decisions for them. In practice the Central Bank only maintains its independent action whilst it continues to please the sovereign. Parliaments and Congress can change the rules governing the Central Banks, change the targets, change the personnel when need arises. They can even change the money, as the German government instructed the German Central Bank to do when they surrendered the DM.

The Euro lacks some of the usual arrangements. There is a so called independent Bank, but it changes policy quite frequently and clearly listens to the ebb and flow of political debate about whether to buy in bonds, whether to monetise any debt and whether to change interest rates. Like other Central Banks, in the middle of the Credit Crunch it joined in a co-ordinated lowering of rates and related actions which arose out of Finance Minister discussions. Unlike sovereign countries, the Euro lacks a single authority drawing up a single state budget, single political control over the levels of sovereign borrowing, and a single issuer of sovereign debt.

The architects of the Euro recognised the potential weakness. They said Euro area governments had to keep their stock of debt below 60% of National Income, and keep annual deficits below 3%. Unfortunately they did not enforce the governance to ensure this happened. Some states borrowed far more. They were free riders at the lower average rate for a bit. Now they face spiralling debt costs, as markets have come to realise there is no EU sovereign guarantee on states’ debt.

A single currency area also needs strong banking regulation, capable of keeping all the main  banks in the system solvent and liquid. The Central Bank either has to do the regulating itself, or be confident in the banking regulator. The Central Bank has a duty to supply liquidity to all banks should need arise.  The ECB has done this for much of the time, but recently announced it wished to reduce the amounts lent under special facilities. In particular it wanted a refinancing of Irish banks which led to the week-end crisis of the Irish state financing.

The ECB has to be comfortable with the solvency regulation of main Euro area  banks. If it has any doubts it needs the ability to sort these out in private with the bank concerned and or the bank regulator. All banks in the system must be deemed to be solvent and seen to be solvent. They should then be offered whatever liquidity it takes if there is a run on their deposits or wholesale funding. To reassure investors it is likely the Euro authorities have to conduct new tests and hold private discussions with each bank, and make sure every bank has a plan to strengthen its position where this is needed.

This week has seen major advances in the task of finding a parent for the Euro. We have the first issue of EU bonds with an EU sovereign backer, as they raise money for the Euro bail out fund. We have more support for Euro area banks announced by the ECB. They  now need to use the time they have bought to create a true sovereign. That is  an economic government of the Euro area that controls debt and deficits and ensures strongly regulated banks.