The Euro and the state of EU banks

 

The Euro crisis is especially worrying given the state of the European banking system. In practice the EU member states stand behind their major banks. State finance and bank finance is almost one and the same thing. Problems in banks require state support, as recently seen in Ireland. The more the member states put money into their banks, the worse the deterioration in their own finances and the more strains are placed on their government bond markets.

The EU authorities understood this and undertook stress tests of the main banks in their system. They published the results in July 2010, showing  that seven banks out of 91 studied needed additional capital to have sufficiently strong balance sheets to withstand  a double shock. The Committee of European Banking Supervisors confirmed that no major bank studied was insolvent, and that all had sufficient capital to survive  even if the two shocks materialised.

The authorities envisaged the right kind of shocks. They proposed that there could be a double dip recession, with no growth in 2011. This may well happen in Portugal and Greece, on  the EU’s own forecasts.  They argued that there could be losses on EU member states government bonds, commonly held by banks as assets.

The problem with the stress tests, mentioned extensively by commentators at the time, was they were not particularly stressful. The test to ensure banks could cope with a sovereign debt problem only wrote sums off the bonds held in banks’ trading books. The Regulators assumed that the longer term holdings of bonds by the banks were fine as they could hold them to maturity and would not therefore incur losses. The stress test assumed a 75 basis point increase in 10 year borrowing rates (an additional 0.75%) and another 70 basis points on top for the EU average to allow for markets pushing up the borrowing rates of weaker countries by more.

These figures led the testers to cut 23% off the value of Greek bonds, 12.3% off the value of Spanish bonds, 12.8% off the value of Irish bonds, 14% off the value of Portuguese bonds, 10.2% off UK bonds and 4.7% off German.

As we have seen in the Greek and Irish crises, the markets can be more punishing than this. Yields on 10 year Greek debt have risen to 12% and on Irish to over 9% compared to 2.5% on German. Banks do lose money on their holdings as well as on their trading books, if you mark the bond value to market prices. There is also an impact on confidence and the valuations of other assets like property in the affected countries which might also damage the banks.

The Stress tests revealed that five Spanish banking groups would have Tier One ratios below 6% if the conditions of the tests took place. Diada (3.9%), Espiga (5.6%), Civica (4.7%), Unnim (4.5%) and Cajasur (4.3%)  (figures assuming the double hit) were all thought to need extra capital. The German Hypo Real Estate bank and the Agricultural Bank of Greece also failed the test.  Several others were close to the 6% cut off, including Allied Irish and the Greek bank, Piraeus.

Investors in recent days have worried that a more severe test should have been applied. Banks could lose more on their government  bond holdings than imagined. In addition, the property sectors in Ireland and Spain are weak, with rising amounts of empty property and falling prices in many locations. Property remains a fundamental underpinning of banking activity, representing a high proportion of the collateral used for loans.

So what should the authorities do? In the short term there need to be reassuring statements from the European Central Bank that it stands ready to offer whatever liquidity these banks need. As all the main banks in the European system are said to be solvent and creditworthy according to their EU Regulators. Tthe Central Bank has to ensure they stay liquid even if the market loses confidence in them and withdraws funds.

In addition it looks as if the banking Regulators need to work  behind the scenes with the most vulnerable banks, and  agree an action programme with each to raise its ratios and cut its risks. Banks can do this by selling assets, making more profit, selling whole businesses to others, writing off bad debts and losses, raising new capital, merging with better capitalised  rivals and in a number of other ways. When they reach an agreement with a vulnerable bank about a clear way forward this should then be announced to the markets so they can see that their doubts and worries are misplaced.

All this will be easier if the economies of western Europe are growing. Consumer debt is less risky if people have jobs and can look forward to rising wages. Business loans are less risky if business is expanding and turnover rising. Property debt is less risky if property is in demand and rents have stopped falling.

We will look at the way to get faster growth  tomorrow.

Wokingham Times

             The last couple of weeks have been taken up with the Euro crisis. The Greek bail out on May 2nd did not stop the problem spreading. As you have seen it is now Ireland’s turn to take the Euro misery of higher taxes, cuts in spending, and wage cuts.

             I was not happy with the way the European authorities converted a serious problem into a crisis. They briefed against Ireland when the Irish government pointed out it had the money it needed  to spend until the middle of next year. They said Ireland needed a loan immediately. The European Central Bank (ECB) let it be known it did not wish to carry on lending to the main Irish banks on the scale it has been doing. This precipitated the need for an large Irish loan to replace some of that ECB support. Doing all this in public undermined market confidence in Ireland and in the Euro area generally and created a sense of crisis. That did not seem wise to me. It would have been better if the ECB had continued to supply the cash the Irish banks needed, whilst  conducting firm talks in private about how the risks and losses could be reduced and assets and businesses sold to start to cut the borrowing needed.

              I have been seeking guarantees from the UK government that they will not lend money for any future bail out of any Euro country. One of the successes of the long Conservative years in opposition was to help keep the UK out of the Euro. I see no reason why we should pay the bills of Euroland when we are not members. The Euro area has several large and prosperous countries that now owe an obligation to their neighbours as they share a currency with them. They also need to decide amongst themselves how much central discipline there should be in future, to prevent a recurrence of too much borrowing in some of the member states of the currency area.

                 When I wrote a couple of books urging the UK to stay out of the European single currency I argued that a successful single currency area needed a single economic government which can control the amount each state borrows. It also needs to have generous transfer  payments, so that the richer areas within the currency zone can send money to the poorer parts to keep things fairer and more even. That is what we do in the sterling single currency area, with large transfer payments flowing from the richer to the poorer parts of the Union. One area cannot devalue to price itself back into the market, so it needs help from other areas that are more successful.

                I do not think the massive loan bail out for Ireland ends the crisis or solves all the problems. Both Ireland and Greece have to show how they can rebuild their damaged economies and banking systems and generate enough extra tax revenue to pay the bills. The European authorities have to get smarter to stop exactly the same type of crisis blowing up in Portugal or Spain or somewhere else. Meanwhile the important thing is for the UK to use its flexibility to set a competitive exchange rate to export its way back to faster growth. The UK needs to avoid more spending abroad which it cannot afford, as it undertakes the difficult task of reining in its large public deficit.

Bail and cut – the EU’s policy to save the Euro

 

                    The EU officials who are planning how to save the Euro are following a kind of economic sado-masochism as their  strategy. They can enjoy watching member states struggle as they pile on the controls and requirements for them to cut spending and raise taxes.  They themselves put up their own budgets and salaries and send the bill to the Union members. The states in difficulty have to enjoy the results of the strategy,  saying thank you for the bail outs and cuts which represent the policy.

                      There are four elements to the approach. The first is to offer loans on quite expensive terms to any state that needs financing. Greece and Ireland have been through the process. The Union is able to use the loan negotiations as a means to exerting more control over the budget of the state concerned. There might be more such bail outs. The cost of Portuguese, Spanish and Italian borrowing is rising despite the Irish bail out “to stop contagion.”

                           The second is to tighten discipline over the budgets of all member states. The weaker ones are meant to take heed of what is happening to the states going through bail out, and cut enough off spending or put taxes up sufficiently  to avoid a similar fate.

                            The third is to take new powers for the Union to control budgets more strictly in future, limiting the amount any state can borrow in the common currency. States will  be fined or made to lodge special deposits with the centre if they are errant. This way the Union hopes to avoid a repeat of the current debt crisis.

                           The fourth is to impose new rules on how states borrow after 2013. They will require states to put a clause in any loan agreement to say that if the state gets into difficulties it may reduce the amount of interest or the amount of capital it repays. This would replace the current de facto decision of the Union to bail out member states so they can repay existing borrowings.

                            This is a compromise policy which is unlikely to work. If they succeed in controlling budget deficits after 2013 the warning to the bond markets is needless. In the meantime it is spooking markets and making it more difficult for states to raise money. Preventing a future problem does not solve the current one.

                                 Markets are unimpressed by the bail outs, because they fail to address the underlying problem, the lack of growth in the struggling states. Wiithout growth,cutting the deficits and paying the interest is going to be very difficult if not impossible. The EU’s policy has led it to forecast no growth for Greece and Portugal next year.

                              Later this week I will set out some of the other options the EU has to save the Euro which would work better.