Last week John reviewed our new book Masters of Nothing, and he has invited us to reply to the comments left on the site.
We’ve found that you keep learning about a book you’ve written after you’ve written it, thanks to the comments of others, and the discussion it provokes, so we are grateful to everyone who put fingers to keyboard.
One of the reasons we wrote this book is because we wanted to provoke a discussion that was largely absent before 2008, a discussion about the way our financial markets behave, and the need for regulators to look to the big picture, instead of huge piles of box-ticking rules.
The discussion under John’s review is wide-ranging, informed and insightful. One of the key themes that emerged was the importance of competition within the financial system. Nearly all comments agreed that a more competitive banking industry would go a long way towards averting future systemic crises. There was also a broad consensus on the principal that market discipline must be restored – that banks should be allowed to fail without disrupting the wider economy.
We agree. More competition is crucial. But we would add an important qualification.
Groupthink, the herd mentality and our impulsive inclination to buy into ‘get-rich-quick’ stories, mean that large numbers of smaller financial institutions are just as capable of getting swept up in bubble manias as their global counterparts. People behave differently in groups than as individuals: that’s a fact of life.
The best defence against such complacency is not only downsizing or ring-fencing, but a culture of responsibility amongst the senior management of major financial institutions. This points to stronger boards, a regulator prepared to challenge irresponsible behaviour, and the ultimate sanction of prosecution for those executives who imperil our economy.
Several readers argued that in a free market the composition of a board, or the compensation package of a senior executive is the business of shareholders alone. Conversely shareholders and not taxpayers should absorb the consequences of banking failures.
Yet there’s a reason the state stepped in to save banks: when the whole financial system, and so whole economy was put at risk. So the taxpayer is on the hook – whether we like it or not.
All too often in recent history shareholders have not made it their business to assess the effectiveness of their executives, or the true nature of so-called ‘incentive’ packages. The structure of modern shareholding, which conveys a disproportionate influence on huge institutional funds, often means individual shareholders are ill-equipped to provide this kind of oversight. This is a market failure, which is why we call for the greater professionalisation of non-executive directors, who need both the time, the expertise and the incentives to hold the executive management to account.
Several comments, which throw light on some of the most interesting issues, deserve a more specific response.
‘Major Loophole’ made an argument that we strongly identified with, suggesting that in the late 1990s the ‘old hands’ of local branches came to be dominated by ‘younger, less experienced ‘bean counter’ style managers,’ who ‘crucially, were given lending targets, the meeting of which, of course, led to qualifying for our old friend—the bonus.’
Such perverse incentives were a key aspect of the crash, but Major Loophole hints at a more fundamental problem with modern finance: a detachment from the society it serves. Too few decision-makers at the height of the boom questioned the wider consequences of what was effectively financial pollution.
Robert K wrote: ‘the idea that a rule-maker should control waves of waves of optimism and economic greed is silly.’
We agree. One of our central arguments is that you cannot legislate human nature out of existence. The cycles of euphoria and panic – and the asset bubbles they generate are an inherent part of capitalism. What we suggest instead is that both policy and economic thought should be shaped in a way which takes account of human nature. We know, for example, that there can be no risk-aversion without fear, and we have to bear this in mind when we think about incentives. Similarly, we know that there is a relationship between testosterone and risk-taking, and this needs to be considered when we think about the role of women in finance.
Ralph Musgrave picked up on the role of the Bank of England’s new Financial Policy Committee:
‘The idea that the Bank of England should have the “the authority and the power to be able to tell a large bank that its strategy is too reckless…” is naïve. Various regulators had that power prior to the crunch, but they just got swept along with the irrational exuberance.’
This is a question we deal with at length in the book. It’s absolutely true that the regulators got caught up in what Alan Greenspan labelled ‘irrational exuberance’: the euphoria of the bubble. As we argue in our chapter on regulation, the FSA’s failure was a failure of institutional culture, in which box-ticking and the rulebook came to replace big-picture thinking and personal initiative. We need instead a regulatory institution capable of offering both a big-picture view of the UK financial system, and a culture of discretionary decision-making, so that the regulator is always one step ahead of those who game an abuse the rules. The Bank of England is well placed to provide these two things. But crucially, regulators themselves will inevitably fail, so the system needs to be structured so regulatory failure doesn’t bring the whole economy crashing down.
Finally ‘lifelogic’ asked ‘Who, on earth, has ever though that people behaved rationally?’
In a word: economists.