Madame Lagarde wants more adults in the room to negotiate a Greek settlement. Is she just being dismissive of the Greek government? It does not help find a compromise or solution to be cutting in public about the principle actors in the drama.

Or does she also have in mind those mysterious sources who are foolishly briefing that the Greek banks might have to close on Monday? All those who from positions of authority suggest capital controls or restrictions on Greek bank accounts must know they are fostering a run on the Greek banks.(I am publishing this at the week-end as most banks in Greece are normally closed then. I have no position of authority in the Eurozone anyway). Adults would know this does not help either Greece or the rest of the Eurozone. Responsible custodians of the Euro would see problems in Greek commercial banks as problems for the zone as a whole. After all, the European central Bank has already poured Euro 83 billion into supporting those banks. You would have thought the last thing they wanted was further withdrawals of deposits which simply mean the rest of the zone has to lend Greece yet more money through the ECB.

This blog has also advised the IMF to play no part in financing member governments of the Eurozone, pointing out that a Eurozone member cannot meet usual IMF criteria for loans. A Eurozone member state cannot devalue to become more competitive, and cannot print more money to repay loans. The IMF would not lend money to Scotland but would expect the UK to borrow the money Scotland needs, so why does it lend money to Greece when the Eurozone could borrow the money Greece needs if it wished to do so? How grown up has the approach of the IMF been?

The modern temptation for prominent politicians and senior officials to take to the media and negotiate in public on sensitive matters of finance and confidence makes it more difficult to stabilise troubled situations and to find a solution. How grown up is it to think that another round of public spending cuts will help the Greek economy recover, after falling by a massive 25% in incomes and output? The UK by agreement of all parties usually allows the deficit to rise when the economy is in deep recession. How grown up is to think pay and pension cuts and more redundancies in an economy with 25% unemployment will be acceptable to Greek people and therefore something the Greek government can sign up to?

My view is both the Greek government and the Eurozone bosses are wrong about how to solve the Greek economic crisis. The first step I would recommend is exit from the Euro and devaluation. Given that both sides refuse to do that, the Eurozone has to accept Greece needs more money to keep going, and Greece has to accept it needs to work with the agreement of its creditors. The complete absence of give and take on both sides is worrying and prolongs the agony and the damage. This is not how a single currency should be run. It confirms my view that EURO stands for European Unemployment and Recession Organisation.

John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con): I have always been a Unionist, but my idea of my country, the United Kingdom, is that it must be a democracy at peace with itself, and can only proceed as a happy and successful democracy if it has the consent of most of the people most of the time to the Union institutions and the powers of those institutions.

I am pleased that, because we proceed democratically and understand the need for consent, this Parliament listened to Scotland and, quite recently, granted a referendum to establish whether it was the settled will of the Scottish people to leave the United Kingdom altogether and set up their own arrangements. We discovered two things as a result of that democratic exercise. We discovered that the Scottish National party itself was not arguing for full independence: it wanted to remain part of the currency union, for example. I do not see how it is conceivably possible for an independent country to be part of a currency union.

Peter Grant (Glenrothes) (SNP): Is the right hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that Germany is not an independent nation?

John Redwood: That is exactly the problem: Germany is not an independent nation. No member of the eurozone is an independent nation, and that is why those countries are experiencing such trouble. The trouble is not just for Greece, which is very visibly not independent, because it is being told how to conduct its economic policy. Germany is not independent either. Germany did not wish to lend Greece huge sums of money, but the European Central Bank, acting in the name of Germany, has advanced huge sums of money, which it will find very difficult to get back, but which Germany has to stand behind.

Patricia Gibson (North Ayrshire and Arran) (SNP) rose—

John Redwood: If SNP Members will allow me a little time, I will say things that they will like. I am not trying to make life difficult for them.

This is my analysis. In the referendum the SNP went for something more akin to home rule than what I would regard as full independence, but at that stage the Scottish people said no even to that. They seemed to say yes to the rather larger devolution of powers that the three main Unionist parties were then offering. However, we are now experiencing new circumstances.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh), who has tabled a very interesting amendment, I think that this Parliament must listen to the new voice of the Scottish people. It is clear that there has been a shift of opinion towards more home rule than the Unionist parties were offering at the time of the referendum. That is why we are here today, listening very carefully to what the SNP has to say, and that is why I think it extremely important for us to have this debate on full fiscal independence, or fiscal autonomy. It would be one way for our Parliament to respond when the Scottish people have said, “We do not want to be completely independent as a separate country, but we want much more self-government—or home rule—than was envisaged by the Unionist parties at the time of the referendum, because we can see that that was not very popular.”

The Unionist parties collectively did rather badly in Scotland come the general election. [Interruption.] Well, between them, they received just under half the vote, while the Scottish nationalist party received just over half the vote. Because the Unionist vote was split, practically no Unionist Members of Parliament were elected, but it is still the case that Scottish opinion is fairly evenly balanced. The Scottish nationalists did not get 70% or 80% of the vote. If they had done, then, as far as I am concerned, they would really be in a position to tell us the answer, but, as judged by the vote, they speak for only about half the Scottish people. However, as representatives, they speak for practically all the Scottish people because they have most of the Members in this place.

I am listening very carefully and will want to hear more about what SNP Members want, but I am also very conscious that, in parallel with this exercise on powers as set out in this Bill, in some way far more important negotiations are already under way on what the new financial settlement will be, and those are not yet being reported to this House. That is crucial not just to the SNP and its representation of the Scottish people, but to the people of England. I find the more home rule that is on offer and the more we hear the Scottish voice, the more I have to be an advocate not of the Union, but of England, because someone needs to speak for England and to say that the consequences of much enhanced Scottish devolution, and some fiscal devolution as well, are serious for England. England needs to be in the discussion just as Scotland does, as this is our joint country and a major change in its arrangements will have a fundamental impact on England.

While I am very attracted to the idea of my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough that it would be a shrewd move to, for once, get ahead of the Scottish appetite for home rule and on this occasion to grant full fiscal devolution, we need to ask how feasible that is and what the consequences will be for Scotland and England. If Scotland wishes to be part of common welfare and pension guarantees, some limitation is already imposed on the spending side of full fiscal devolution. We have to think about the position of England if cross-guarantees are being offered for some part of that welfare package. If we are going to proceed in the way the Government currently plan and the way the negotiations are currently being undertaken—as I understand it, there is an attempt to find a way of adjusting the block grant for Scotland to take into account the new Scottish responsibilities, as some items of spending will have to be added in as a result of the devolution of new functions, and there will be a reduction in the block grant to take account of those taxes that are now Scotland’s to fix and collect—therein lies an immediate problem.

Mr Angus Brendan MacNeil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (SNP): Would not an easier solution be for Scotland to collect its own tax, as Catalonia does, and then pay into the centre, rather than the centre paying out? The taxes should be raised by the Government of the territory paying the taxes and paid into the centre rather than giving them to the centre for it to then pay out. In that way, the centre will have to stop saying it is subsidising people when it returns their own taxes.

John Redwood: But if Scotland wisely decides to have lower tax rates to make itself more popular, the Union will be losing out if those lower tax rates collect less money.

Mr MacNeil: The right hon. Gentleman should realise that it is not lower taxes that have made the SNP more popular; it is better public services in Scotland—that has given us 50% of the vote versus his party’s 37%.

John Redwood: If Scotland wishes to impose higher taxes, the Union has less of a problem with that—unless it chooses to impose higher tax rates which collect less revenue, because those could be a problem for the Union as a whole—but it would be a problem for Scotland if it had to collect higher tax levels and it did not get all the money back; I would have thought it would want to get all the extra money back that it was collecting. Full fiscal autonomy means it would take responsibility for both raising the money and spending it. If Scotland wishes to spend more under fiscal autonomy, she can do so if she has a magic way of getting more money off people through either higher or lower tax rates, whichever work in the particular fiscal circumstances.

We need to have working papers on how full fiscal devolution might work and whether it is truly full fiscal devolution, because if we are going to full fiscal devolution, England will want guarantees that we are no longer acting as a buffer or subsiding the Scottish settlement, just as Scotland will want guarantees that she has got a fair deal and is capturing the benefits of her fiscal independence. If we go for a mixed system, which is where we currently are with the real debate between the Smith commission, the pro-Union parties and the SNP, there is a lot to be worked out, and I hope that at some point those on the Treasury Bench will share some of their thinking with the House.

Andrew Gwynne (Denton and Reddish) (Lab): I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with much of what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. Do not these arguments illustrate the asymmetrical nature of the devolution settlement across the four nations of the United Kingdom? Does he agree that whichever funding model we go for in relation to Scotland, there will be implications for the finances of the other three nations? Does he not think that we need a constitutional convention to put that right?

John Redwood: No, I do not think that we need a constitutional convention, because that would create endless delay and complications. I agree with previous comments that we are here to try to solve this problem for our respective constituents. I spent quite a lot of my time during the election speaking for England and saying that I wanted to ensure that England got a reasonable deal out of this. SNP representatives clearly did the same in relation to Scotland, and we both achieved similar levels of success in attracting lots of votes for what we were saying.

Mr MacNeil: The right hon. Gentleman talks about getting good deals for the various parts of the UK, but let us look at the wider British Isles. Does he think that the aggregate GDP of the British Isles would be as high as it is today without the full fiscal autonomy that the Republic of Ireland, the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom all enjoy? If the aggregate GDP of the British Isles is higher for those reasons, does he not agree that it will be higher still when Scotland achieves its full fiscal autonomy?

John Redwood: I start from the point of view of democracy. A democratic state has to have the full range of powers, including fiscal autonomy and its own currency. That is different from asking: what is your state? I would still rather have the United Kingdom as my state, but I have just explained that if it is the will of the Scottish people that the UK is no longer their preferred state, they must leave—of course they must.

Mr MacNeil: The right hon. Gentleman is being very kind in enabling our dialogue to continue. I am sure he would acknowledge that the UK functioned between 1603 and 1707, when the Parliaments were independent.

John Redwood: Well, it functioned after a fashion, but I would not have wanted to live through that time. The nations were clearly not nearly as rich as they are today. Labour Members sometimes try to pretend that we have gone back to an ancient age, but I am sure that none of them would willingly go back in time and live in that era, because we are obviously so much better off now.

Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab): I do not want to divert from the subject, but was not the reason for the Scots’ enthusiasm in going forward in 1707—[Interruption.]It was not an economic blockade; it was speculation in the colonies of central America.

John Redwood: Yes, it was a kind of early version of the banking crash, which also reminds us that Scottish banks can sometimes get into trouble, and that the Union’s insurance can be quite helpful to them.

George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP): May I return the discussion to the here and now? I should like to clarify something that the right hon. Gentleman said, because I think I agree with him. Is he saying that there was a clear desire in the debate that took place in Scotland post-Smith for a fuller measure of complete domestic fiscal control within the UK, but that achieving it would require serious discussions about how it would work in Scotland and how it would affect the fiscal arrangements in the rest of the UK? Does he agree that it could be done reasonably quickly, but would require transitional arrangements? It cannot be done overnight, but it is the way to go. If we do not do this, we will end up having endless piecemeal discussions, which would produce more friction than light.

John Redwood: I am making an even more urgent point than that. I am saying that that discussion is going on in parallel while we are debating this Bill. I hope that its content will be shared with the House at some point, because it is a matter of great importance to the United Kingdom, to England, to Scotland and so forth. As I understand it, those taking part in the negotiations are up against these very issues. If, for example, too much independence is given to Scotland on spending patterns, would there be a Union guarantee to pay for it all? How would it be fair to other parts of the Union if Scotland could increase her spending without having to take responsibility for raising the money for it? If Scotland starts to raise more of her own money, how do we adjust the block grant? In the current negotiations, nobody is suggesting getting rid of the block grant and saying that Scotland can have all her own money and just spend her own money. I am not even sure that is what the SNP wants. Negotiation is going on about how far—[Interruption.] If the SNP genuinely wants all that, that is fine. We then have to have a serious discussion, before it could be agreed to, over the borrowing. I will call it “borrowing”; I do not think “black hole” is a terribly useful term.

It is obvious that the United Kingdom has been living well beyond its means as a state for many years and is still borrowing large sums, and that, collectively, the United Kingdom, including Scotland, has built up those debts. Some of that money has been spent in Scotland and some of it has been spent in England. If we went for so-called full fiscal autonomy, we would face the question of what do we do about the new borrowing and what do we do about the past borrowing. One thing we have surely learnt from Greece and other places in the euro currency union is that the borrowing of a state in a currency union is of great concern and interest to the rest of that union. There would therefore have to be an agreement on borrowing, with past debt levels attributed to Scotland, because it would have to pay an interest bill on those. Future build-up of Scottish debt would also have to be addressed: whether it would be separate Scottish debt or would still come with the full Union guarantee, which would probably make it a bit cheaper. That becomes the centre of the row, rather than it being over which taxes we have.

Patricia Gibson: Does the right hon. Gentleman not agree that successive Westminster Governments could learn much from the economic management of the Scottish Parliament, which has balanced its budget, in a fixed budget, every year, while Westminster has run up successive debts?

John Redwood: That is because all the time that it is a subsidiary Parliament of the Union, and part of our public expenditure and borrowing plans, it has to abide by the remit. The hon. Lady is right in that it has been given a tougher remit than the Union gives itself, but it is not fair to say that that is of no interest or benefit to Scotland, because of course much of the Union expenditure is also being committed proportionately in Scotland and so it is Scotland’s share of the debt as well. I am making a factual statement; I am not trying to make party political points, wind up the SNP, rerun the referendum or anything like that. I am just trying to get this Committee to understand that grave and big issues are being hammered out elsewhere, we are not hearing about them and they impinge very much on this crucial debate that we are now having.

I have intervened in the debate because I want an opportunity to talk about this financial settlement, which matters to England as well as to Scotland. The proposal put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough brings things centre stage. If we went down his route and had full fiscal autonomy, I would want to know what that meant; how much responsibility Scotland would take, for example, for pensions as well as welfare; and what the borrowing settlement would be. The residual is the borrowing, and unless we know what the answer is on that, we still will not have a happy Union or stable expenditure.

Ian Blackford (Ross, Skye and Lochaber) (SNP): I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his most gracious speech and his thoughtful remarks about the future of the constitutional arrangements between Scotland and the rest of the UK. It is perhaps worth remembering that when Gordon Brown spoke on behalf of the three Unionist parties prior to the referendum, what was offered was as close to federalism as we could get. What was talked about was home rule in the spirit of Keir Hardie. It is akin to the remarks that the right hon. Gentleman is making. It is perhaps worth remembering that the manifesto commitment the SNP stood on was delivering powers for a purpose to the Scottish Parliament. He is right: that is what the Scottish people voted for in returning 56 Members of Parliament to this Chamber.

John Redwood: Then I think we need to have another debate, on another day, which looks at what is going on in these important financial discussions. Although my constituents are interested in what powers Scotland gets, they are far more interested in how the money works between the different parts of the Union. We have no papers before us today to elucidate that.

Ian Murray (Edinburgh South) (Lab): For the second time in five and a bit years, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. On the complicated nature of the fiscal framework, which I believe he is trying to unpack, does he not agree that the Labour new clause, which will be debated at some point, to set up an independent commission on the costs and implications of full fiscal autonomy provides a much more reasonable and sensible approach?

John Redwood: We are where we are. Promises were made, I thought in good faith, by the three Front-Bench teams. They were not my chosen promises; they were made on behalf of the three Unionist parties. They did the job for the referendum, but they then did not do much of a job for the Unionist parties at the general election. However, we cannot now be seen to be delaying for any great length. There needs to be proper work—and I am sure that proper work is going on in the Government at the moment as they try to work out a financial settlement in parallel to this Bill. I am just suggesting that perhaps this Parliament needs to have some of that thinking shared with it.

Today is the first opportunity, within the clear parameters of new clause 3, to try to expose a bit of the thinking on how a limited amount of fiscal autonomy will work, and on how many of these taxes Scotland will not only collect, but be responsible for and have knocked off the block grant. As I remember it, when the leaders came up with this promise, Gordon Brown was a big voice—obviously, he was not one of the leaders at the time—for rather less fiscal autonomy. He was trying to stop Scotland controlling her own income tax revenues, so I do not entirely share the interpretation of the Labour Front-Bench team of what Mr Brown was trying to do at that point.

I will bring my remarks to a close with the simple conclusion that the world has moved on because of the general election result. The debate on money is taking place elsewhere, but we currently have a short debate about money here. I hope that the Front-Bench team will share some of its thoughts on money. Fiscal devolution seems to be attractive to many people in Scotland, but we need to know where it ends and how we sort out all those crucial issues about debt and borrowing as well as about shared policies such as pensions.

I was asked this week in the Commons if I thought Germany was an independent country. Some were surprised when I said that of course it is not. Some people keep on confusing power with sovereignty. Germany is a powerful country, but her actions are now very circumscribed by the EU and more especially by the Euro. Germany had no wish to lend large sums of money to Greece, but has done so indirectly via the European Central Bank because she cannot win the votes and arguments on that body on some of the most important issues.

Germany and Greece are now locked together in a relationship of their making which is bigger and more powerful than either government. Mrs Merkel has to allow more and more lending to Greece whilst in public saying there will be no more loans unless Greece agrees to austerity policies to cut the deficit more. Greece has to listen to endless sermons on how to change its public spending and tax policies.In order to qualify for official loans to keep it going she has to agree to some of the advice. Previous Greek governments accepted the requirements and presided over a 25% decline in the output and incomes of their country as a result.

I have always assumed they will muddle through to a “solution”, with Greece promising a bit more by way of reform, and Germany agreeing to more loans. That would be more of the same which has sustained this difficult and precarious relationship since Greece joined the Euro. Germany has more supporters in the rest of the Euro than Greece on some of these issues, but has lost the battle over quantitative easing and a generally easier monetary policy.

The brinkmanship is now quite extensive on both sides. Germany has recently threatened Greece with the imposition of capital controls. This would mean that instead of the European Central Bank continuing to lend the Greek banks any amount of money they need to replace lost deposits, the Greek banks would instead have to tell depositors they can no longer withdraw their money, or can only withdraw it on worse terms. This is what the Euro authorities made Cyprus do, creating effectively a Cypriot Euro which was worth less than everyone else’s euro. The Syriza Greek government for its part simply refuses to cut pensions and pay, pointing out that Greece needs more demand to grow, not less.

Germany has drawn attention to the possibility of capital controls because clearly Germany is rightly alarmed by the huge build up in ECB loans to Greece, now in excess of Euro 83 billion. Sometime these two – and the other Euro members- are going to have to sit down and talk about debt cancellation. The trouble is the creditors will want more austerity policies which the Greek people and their government do not want. That’s why it is always easier to put off a settlement, just as long as the Germans have under the rules of the game to stand behind ever more lending to an unreformed Greece.

Neither side has wanted to bring the crisis to a head. If one does, then we will see the real negotiation. If Germany wants to keep the entire Euro enough she will have to allow Greece more money and more leeway. If Greece is more worried about capital controls and being excluded from the full Euro scheme then she will have to bow to more of the demands of her creditors. Agreement means Greece spending less or taxing more, and it means Germany paying or lending more to Greece. It is still not clear which side is the stronger in its resolve.

Yesterday news came that the French have blocked the border with Italy to impede the progress of illegal economic migrants. This is against the Shengen rules they signed up to. Italy demands “burden sharing”, seeking a system of quotas for all EU states to share the migrants she lets in to her country. The UK has exercised its opt out from any such measure, having in the past stood apart from Shengen common frontiers.

The problem with the burden sharing policy is it acts as an open invitation to hundreds of thousands of potential migrants to come to the EU. Is it a helpful policy  policy to offer a better life to all the brightest, best and most energetic people in poorer countries, as it will make the growth and greater prosperity of those places that much more difficult to achieve?

I heard a difficult  question recently  about  the issue of the UK’s role in the Mediterranean. Why we did not ask the navy ships to go to the ports in Libya where the people traffickers operate and offer free passage to economic migrants to spare them getting on to the dangerous boats and subsequently needing rescue? The first response someone else offered  to the question was for him not to suggest such a bad policy. The UK  after all does not welcome illegal economic migrants into the EU, so would not wish to offer them free passage in naval vessels. The person pursued his case. He said that surely it was similar to what the government is doing, but with the added advantage that the people we are trying to save from the waters of the sea out of their dangerous boats would no longer be at risk if we transported them all the way.

The question revealed the tension  at the heart of current policy. The UK is a decent country so it does not wish to stand by and watch as people drown when we and others like us can help save lives. The navy is doing good and has stopped people losing their lives. We have a great humanitarian impulse. The UK also has a policy of not encouraging illegal economic migrants. If we pick people up at sea and deliver them to the very place they wished to go illegally, we could b e offsetting  the policy of refusing illegals entry into the EU. If Italy grants these migrants EU permission to stay and work in the EU they can then travel to the UK as legal migrants.

There are many ways that the UK could bring its humanitarian instincts into line with its opposition to illegal economic migrants arriving in the EU. It could do more with the world community to stabilise and encourage a prosperous peace in the countries people are fleeing. It could do more with the local authorities in the ports where they operate and with the world community to stamp out people trafficking. It could if all else fails continue to help save people in distress at sea, but take them back to their port of departure. The ports of departure surely should be made more responsible for their fate, as those ports fail to root out the people traffickers and allow unseaworthy boats to attempt the Mediterranean crossing. They allow the cruelty of the traffickers.

I wrote this recently for Conservative Home, but would like to share it with readers here:

It is one of the ironies of life in the EU that an apparently good idea, more free trade with the USA, ends up with both left of centre and right of centre critics combining to condemn the way the EU has been doing it.

Don’t get me wrong. I think free trade creates more jobs and greater prosperity. Successive rounds of tariff reductions by GATT and the World Trade Organisation has helped power world growth and expanded exports and imports greatly in recent decades. My first criticism of the EU and TTIP is the eternal delays they have created. The idea of closer trade links was first seriously explored in 1990 at the time of the Transatlantic Declaration. 1995 saw the establishment of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, which too wished to pursue freer trade rules bilaterally. If the UK had been free to negotiate our own trade deals instead of having to do it through the EU, I am sure we would have had a good trade deal with the USA years ago. Now some 25 years later we are still a long way off an EU/US Trade Agreement.

The EU concedes that it has been overtaken by the WTO. Half of all trade between the EU and the US is already tariff free, and the rest faces an average tariff of under 3%. It is good news the EU says it would be happy to surrender its 10% external tariff on cars. Why doesn’t it just do so? The US only charges 2.5% on cars imported from the UK or the rest of Europe, just one quarter of the high tax the EU imposes. The EU should just get on with it and remove the tariff. There are higher tariffs on some shoes and clothes that could also be cut to help consumers.

Because there are few tariffs left, the negotiations have become complex and are to do with rules and regulations more than with customs duties. The two sides are looking at ways of harmonising or co-ordinating difficult matters like Intellectual property, competition law, safety regulation of food and chemicals, public procurement and banking regulation. They are being drawn into areas of government which may limit the USA or the EU right to make their own decisions, in a way which will be all too familiar to UK voters who have considerable experience of the supranational EU intervening in our affairs.

Many on the left in the UK are alarmed by TTIP. I think they are wrong to conclude that the NHS will be damaged by it through offering rights to US health companies to compete in our monopoly health care in the public sector as this is expressly ruled out. However, they are right to ask how much power will the Agreement transfer from Parliament and government to this international agreement and the courts.? How will it affect employee rights, public procurement and other important domestic sensitivities?

The EU is busily trying to impede some areas of possible agreement. The French have already vetoed any possible agreement on audio visual industries. The EU is making heavy weather of negotiations on freer trade in agricultural produce, as the EU will not allow genetically modified product, has different views to the US on hormone treated beef and various pesticides. Some in the UK agree with the EU position on these matters. None of us wish to see risks taken with our health, and understand the caution of some EU regulators. It just means more delay and difficulty in ever reaching an Agreement which might mean something.

The TTIP for me is not an argument to stay with the EU, but another reason why I think the EU lets us down. It gives free trade a bad name with the left, by ensnaring the talks in difficult territory on health and safety, employee standards and public procurement. It means eternal delays in getting progress on tariffs and market access, areas with more positive pay offs for consumers. It means the UK cannot get on with it and shape an Agreement which we like and which suits us.

Thank heavens for the WTO. It has done most of the job for us in getting tariffs down. It’s a pity the EU cannot also do the same, and cannot find a way to further and hurry free trade that does not upset so many of us. The EU’s negotiation of the TTIP just looks like another clumsy EU power grab, allied to anti American rhetoric on sensitive topics which does not help anyone. The danger of that is the wrong kind of TTIP could strengthen the extraterritorial reach of the US legal system, the opposite aim to the claims by the EU.

I’m a romantic when it comes to Magna Carta. I understand its limitations and how it is largely a document of its time. I recognise that it took long years of struggle to control the King and establish an effective Parliament. Magna Carta was nonetheless an important step on the England’s pioneering journey. England was early to recognise and require equality under the law, fair trials, and controls on the executive power of government. Our belief in this idea of freedom, and our shared passion to ban arbitrary government, limit power and make it accountable were the envy of many around the world.

The irony is that as the 800th anniversary of these important beginnings of our long tradition arrives , we see the consequences of being less vigilant about unaccountable power in recent years in our dealings with the European Union. A country known for its assertion of rights against monarchs, has become known now for its feebleness at withstanding the transfer of powers to a continental bureaucracy. Where is the new Magna Carta to limit the power of Brussels? Where is the once mighty Parliament, famed for facing down various Kings until it controlled the kingdom?

Some will say the modern heirs to our Magana Carta tradition lie in the European Parliament and the European Convention of Human Rights. The problem with this interpretation is that to many UK citizens it does not feel like that. Magna Carta placed the power to control the Crown in the hands of those in our own country able to wield it. Later generations wisely extended the power to all adults living as citizens in our land. Can we say this has now been properly transferred to the EU institutions, or will the UK voters see that to restore the magic of the Magna Carta tradition they need to bring power back from Brussels?

Labour are reissuing their old lie that the Conservative party in Opposition backed Labour borrowing plans and advocated light touch regulation of the banks or even deregulation of the banks. They have always wished to duck responsibility for the great crash that occurred on their watch in 2007-8.

There are strong grounds to reject these allegations. I have dug out the relevant quotes of the Opposition Economic Policy review, written early in 2007 and published in the August before the banking crash. The Policy Review included Simon Wolfson, Andrew Feldman, Greg Hands and myself on its steering committee.

1. We warned that there could be a crash as Labour had allowed far too much debt to build up in the system…
P3 “…there is considerable uncertainty in world markets about how far the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England may go in raising rates to squeeze inflation out of the system. They must know there are huge pyramids of debt throughout the system, and inflation will not be killed unless the appetite for more debt is blunted. They also know (apparently they did not!) that if they push interest rates too high for too long they could bring the debt structures crashing down, as we have seen with the sub prime mortgage collapse in the USA, leading to falling asset prices, rising unemployment and even recession”

2. We opposed in Parliament Labour’s regulatory reforms for banks at the time they put them in in 1997 and reminded people why in 2007:

P14 “We are concerned over the division of responsibility between the FSA and the Bank over banking and market regulation….We think it would be safer if the Bank of England had responsibility for solvency regulation of UK based banks, as well as having the overall responsibility to keep the system solvent. Otherwise there could be dangerous delays if a banking crisis hit, with information having to be exchanged between the regulators and there might be gaps in each regulator’s view of the banking sector at a crucial time, when early regulatory action might have spared a worse problem.”

3. We advocated better control of debts and deficit, and itemised the wider state debts which Labour did not report.

P15 said “ We believe that governments should not as a rule borrow to pay for current spending but instead should run healthy current account surpluses in the good years of an economic cycle, so that some latitude is possible in weaker years. We also believe there should be a limit on the total borrowings of the public sector as a percentage of national income……..borrowing is simply deferred taxation, which ultimately will have to repaid by taxpayers with interest.”

P14 “Under Labour there has been a rapid build up in debt, and official figures show the UK’s public sector net debt at £497.7bn (April 2007)….the true extent is almost three times this stated amount”

4. We advocated strict controls over reporting and capital adequacy for all banks, the opposite of saying we wanted to deregulate deposit taking institutions.

P59 “We agree that institutions which take clients money and place it on their own balance sheet or mix it with other funds, should have to meet capital adequacy requirements, and strict reporting requirements. “ Our deregulatory proposals were elsewhere “there is not necessarily a good reason why a regulator should have to be involved in product design and marketing for rich and sophisticated investors”

We decided to use understated language as a responsible opposition. On this site I myself used stronger language to explain how the Bank of England and government could bring on a crash if they did not change policy, and pleaded with them to take action to stop the crash.

On July 5th 2007 I wrote: “So far the general view is that the sub prime mortgage market (in the US) will continue to be in distress, but these problems will not spread. However a similar pyramid of debt has built up around company borrowing….The Central Banks can literally go for broke and hike rates substantially. They will trigger a major decline in corporate debt as well as sub prime lending. …The worst case would be that they do to the USA and the UK what the Japanese authorities did to Japan in 1990, leading to a decade of recession or little growth”

and on July 26th : “On 6 July I warned about the debt mountains built up on both sides of the Atlantic during the decade of easy money, and forecast that the central banks would carry on tightening, leading to further collapses after the sub prime crisis……. I assume the Central banks will back off quite soon. If they don’t it could be quite a collapse”

There were many other blogs along these lines explaining how to stop the crash by intelligent central banking and government intervention.

Angela Merkel is a skilful politician who has stayed at the top of German politics for a long time. This is not the same thing as a strong Germany. She inherited a tradition of making compromises for the Euro and the EU, and has made many more as the contradictions and tensions of the Euro scheme have come to the fore. Judging by what Germany has done on a whole range of “red lines”, we must conclude that Germany does give in to pressure if the cohesion of the Eurozone or the EU is under attack.

The long retreat from German principles began under Mrs Merkel’s predecessor when Germany allowed Greece and other countries that came nowhere near meeting the criteria to join the Euro to be part of the project. Under Mrs Merkel Germany has conceded over the issue of making all member states keep their budget deficits below 3%. Only recently again France has been allowed more leeway. Germany unsuccessfully opposed lending large sums to banks in trouble in the zone. Germany gave in over the huge programme of quantitative easing. Germany has been persuaded to accept a currency that regularly devalues against the dollar, yuan and sterling instead of maintaining a strong currency as Germany always argued for.

The concessions have been biggest over Greece. Germany stated strongly that Greece would not be able to borrow a Euro more unless it stuck to the loan agreements and continued with budget austerity and economic reform. Instead in recent months the European Central Bank has made available large new sums to Greece. This is money some commentators think the ECB and its main shareholders including Germany will not get back. The European authorities have also allowed Greece to borrow more through Treasury Bills to pay for the costs of government. Meanwhile Greece refuses to cut pensions more, to implement labour market reforms, and to cut the deficit as much as the European authorities want. Now there is talk of Germany relaxing the requirements for reform to allow new longer term loans to start to supplant the weekly doses of more lending from the ECB.

It appears that Germany, like the ECB, is extraordinarily flexible. It appears that the budget deficit targets, demands for economic reform, limits on borrowing and requirement for a strong currency mean little, and all can be changed if a country digs in enough. Mr Cameron should take note. It appears Germany wants to keep the UK in the EU. That means we have plenty of bargaining power, given Germany’s well known flexibility. If Germany can be flexible on printing money, on lending more to countries that have already borrowed too much, and on having a weak currency, I am sure she could also be flexible on how many EU decisions the UK just has to accept. They can carry on selling us cars whatever happens, but at risk for them is the UK’s large financial contribution to the EU.

Yesterday the Commons passed another EU Finance Bill. UK voters will have to pay more tax to send a bit more money to the EU as a result. The Minister assured us it would have been a lot more if the UK had not cut the EU budget, and if the UK had no rebate. He reminded us just how much we have lost thanks to Labour giving away an important part of the rebate for no gain.

The two main opposition parties, Labour and the SNP, supported the Bill. They told us they wanted to fund the EU as they wished the UK to stay in come what may. UKIP did not attend the session. Conservative Eurosceptics asked questions and highlighted the problems with sending more money to the EU, aided by the Labour member for Luton North, Mr Hopkins.

I asked Labour if there was any tax demand from the EU that they would oppose. Their front bench confirmed there was not. In office they had allowed a large increase in the EU budget, an increase in UK contributions, and had given away an important part of the rebate. For once SNP and Labour seemed to be in agreement about something.

I made the point that if we have a new relationship based on trade, friendship and co-operation we would not need to pay this huge subscription, and could have a tax cut. Jacob Rees Mogg pointed out they needed to consider the gross contribution after abatement, because if we were free to choose for ourselves we might choose to spend the money the EU does spend in the UK in other ways. Labour said the details of EU finance were not clear, and that the change they wanted was a better explanation. I cannot see what is unclear about the UK’s large net contribution to the EU. It is tax money we pay them so they can spend it in other countries. Voters understand that, even if some MPs do not.