Over the last twenty three years Japan has tried stimulus after stimulus in a desperate bid to get back to the pre 1990 growth rates. Nothing has succeeded.

As a result Japan has gone from having a relatively low debt and deficit, to having the largest public debt as a proportion of GDP of all advanced countries. Japanese public sector debt is now over $12 trillion, and more than 230% of GDP. Money has been borrowed to boost current public spending, and to provide investment stimulus through large public capital projects.

Nor has Japan spared the monetary stimulus as well. Japan has tried liberal amounts of Quantitative easing, has run interest rates close to zero for most of the time, and has made clear it would prefer inflation to deflation. The latest programme of bond buying is just a larger version of what has gone before.

So why hasn’t the Japanese economy taken off? Crude Keynsian reflationists would predict that with this much fiscal and monetary stimulus combined the economy should be in overdrive. Some would accept that the extreme bubble created in the 1980s posed big problems whilst asset prices adjusted, and would agree that the banks remained broken by falling asset values and damaged loans for a long time. In retrospect maybe a sharper crash and more drastic bank write offs and recapitalisations might have speeded up the adjustment and the eventual recovery.

This to me is only part of the story. At about the same time as Japan’s bubble burst something else important happened. The Japanese model of incremental innovation in cars and consumer electricals and electronics which had spwaned a series of world beating companies suddenly met its match from competition elsewhere. The Japanese excellence at making things was copied by the US and Europe, adopting the Toyota type manufacturing systems. The US launched the digital revolution, which Japan found difficult to adopt and develop. Later, China and other Asian centres emerged capable of undermining Japanese competitiveness still further.

The truth is Japan’s era of supremacy making the world’s most competitive cars, tvs,cameras and the rest was undermined both by new products and services she did not develop, and by cheaper competition for the products she does still make. Japan needs a new industry or two and more world beating companies.

Commentators always think there is a simple monetary or budgetary fix. In the end earning a good living in a competitive world comes down to having better goods and services. Japan has lost her edge. In the UK the decline of finance and oil and gas, our two high value added lead sectors of the 90s and noughties, is the background to our current sluggish GDP performance. Spending a bit more in the public sector does not fix this, as Japan shows.

The best way to get the UK economy moving again is to boost real wages. The best way to do that is to control price rises.

Since 2007 there has been a continuous fall in real wages in the UK private sector. For the first couple of years it was sharp, owing to the deep recession. Thereafter it was a bit less pronounced, and mainly occured owing to persistent inflation. The Uk experienced higher inflation than most of the advanced country economies at a time of Credit Crunch.

The Bank has clearly decided to boost money despite the inflation outturn, taking the view that that can stimulate growth. It needs to worry more about the adverse impact on demand and growth that insidious inflation has on living standards and confidence.

Anyone who saves has some of their money stolen by inflation. It can make them even more cautious about spending, as they perceive the need to have more savings to make up for the erosion of value of their money. Anyone relying on work income can find their family budgets become very stretched by price rises. The public sector has increased people’s fears on inflation by indexing many more things to the CPI instead of the RPI and refusing to issue any more National Savings Index linked bonds.

The government is part of the cause of the inflation. Energy prices have been especially troublesome. Both the Labour government and the Coalition government have followed policies of taxing energy more highly and pushing up energy prices in the name of fighting global warming. This has strained family budgets, made UK industry less competitive, and given a great advantage to our competitors in the USA and Asia who have gone for cheaper energy policies.

I have written recently to the Energy Minister, renewing my call for us to follow a lower price energy policy. The recent sharp falls in the oil price will provide some temporary respite, but we need to go much further, and we need to end the extra burden we are having to pay. That means ending the carbon tax, generating more electicity from lower cost options, and exploiting more of our natural resources.

The government has also been keen along with local government to put up fees and charges across the public sector. It would be good to have a two year freeze on all public sector managed prices, allied to requirements that the public sector should not simply raise the subsidy needed for these activites on the grounds that they cannot raise their prices. They should be required to become more efficent instead.

The new Governor of the Bank should be told to renew the inflation target, and told that he should be setting out to hit it soon. The latest fall in world commodity prices, and the current little rise of sterling can help bring this about. Lower inflation would be great news for recovery, and for confidence in UK policy generally.

Now he has the job, the new Governor in waiting for the Bank of England is letting it be known that there are limits to what a solitary Central Banker can achieve.

Mr Carney comes from the global establishment. Doubtless some of the new IMF fashion for more deficit stimulus is rubbing off on him. Doubtless the realisation that the UK is getting closer to an election will mean he wants a bit of room for political movement. After all, no-one wants this Coalition government to survive 2015.

The position he will inherit is not all bad, as some bloggers here suggest. It is interesting that when the UK suffered its first rating downgrade from AAA the cost of ten year borrowing was 2.1%. This week-end, with another agency downgrade just announced, the cost of ten year borrowing is under 1.7%.

There are three likely reasosn for this further fall in UK borrowing costs. The first is the UK authorities stand ready to buy more of their own debt. The second is they already own a large quantity. If they eventually decide to simply cancel the debt they now own, the UK state would have a relatively low outstanding debt. Many market participants are sceptical that the UK authorities will get around to selling this debt they own back to the private sector. The third is there are several Euro countries in a far worse plight than the UK, so the Uk is still to some a “safe haven” at a time of Euro trouble.

Any government would, however, be unwise to think there are no limits on how much it can borrow and print. The UK economy is being held back by a public sector that is both too large for the tax capacity of the current economy, and by a public sector that has not matched the best of the private sector in delivering quality and efficiency. Government does need to work away at bringing tax capacity and spending more into line. It also needs to relieve the 5 year squeeze on the private sector. Next week I will look again at ways to do just that. Some tax rates are too high, the state banks are wrongly structured and regulated, energy prices are too high, and infrastructure investment is too slow and too dependent on state finance.

There are two types of austerity around in Europe today. The first is the type which cuts public sector wages, makes cash cuts in public spending, and forces rapid reductions in deficits. These rapid slimdown programmes are being imposed on the troubled countries of the Euro. Then there is the second type, the UK type, where current public spending overall continues to rise in cash terms, and even to rise a little in real terms, but is cut back from previous forecast levels. They are very different.

Both the UK and the Euro area countries have put up taxes to plug the deficits. Both are experiencing falls in real wages. The worst austerity in the UK is taking pace in the private sector, in the homes of individuals and families. Since the crisis first hit in 2007, UK real wages have on average fallen by 10%. The UK has suffered from higher inflation than many other countries, and private sector wage rises have slowed to almost nothing. Real wages have been badly mauled in Greece, Ireland and Portugal amongst others.

If the IMF and others are going to help find a way out of the current economic predicament in Europe they need first to be honest about which types of austerity different countries have experienced. They also need to grasp that a country without its own currency is in a very different position from one that still has its own currency. Maybe the Head of the IMF is becoming critical of deficit reduction strategies because she thinks a Euro country is the new norm.

An individual Euro country cannot devalue to price itself back into world markets. It cannot create new money to try to stimulate activity. This makes big fiscal adjustments that much more painful, as there is no reason to suppose the lost output created by the higher taxes and the lower spending will be supplanted by mroe private sector acivity.If it were a proper single currency, there would be much larger transfers of grant and loan money from the richer areas to the poorer areas, to make it all more tolerable.

In a country like the UK with its own currency and enthusiaism for looser money there is every chance of offsetting public cuts should these be made. It does, of course, also require mending the banks, so there is an easier mechanism to ensure some of the new money finds its way into productive private sector activities.

The Prime Minister’s claim on radio recently that we are all Thatcherites now is in one sense true, though of course unlikely to go down well with his opponents. I think what he meant was that over 13 years of Labour governments with large majorities they accepted the Thatcher settlement on ballots before strikes, on lower Income Tax rates, and private ownership of the leading energy, transport and industrial utilities. The country did not return to nationalised steel,elecriticity, gas and phones. The state owned banks were not properly nationalised.Top Income Tax stayed at 40% for almost the whole time, and standard rate income tax continued downwards as under the Conservatives.

Many have now written that yesterday marked the passing of an era. I do not see it that way. Margaret Thatcher’s hold and direction of power effectively ended the day her colleagues forced her into the Exchange Rate Mechansim against her better instincts and the advice of her (all too few)friends in government.I felt that her era ended on that day. Sometime later her Conservative opponents got her out of office, confirming the end of her era. In other words, the Thatcher era has been over for around a quarter of a century. We are well into the legacy. Indeed, the last government lived off the achievement of the Conservative years in curbing debts and deficits, and getting inflation down. We have the luxury to keep the best bits – wider ownership, the ending of the Cold War, the lower tax rates – whilst shedding the bad bits like the ERM and the unsuccesful bits like the Poll Tax.

Today it is a common pursuit for commentators and some in politics to ask What would Margaret do now, faced with today’s problems. All the time she was alive I thought this was a cruel question,not one I ever wished to attempt to answer. It was cruel because in her later years she was not in command of all the facts and the arguments in the way she was in her prime. She did not wish to answer that question most of the time for good political reasons, and was not in an informed position to do so. Anyone seeking to suggest her answer ran the risk of presuming too much. Putting words into the mouth of someone who could often not correct a false interpretation or answer back was I thought a most uncharitable thing to do.

Now she has died the twin constraints of good taste and the danger of the lady contradicting the speculator have been removed. I would nonetheless urge people to refrain from doing so. A few of her genuine political friends wish to be the custodians of the flame, distilling the essence of pure Thatcherism into an ever more exclusing brand. That is to misunderstand the lady at her best, where she recruited many non believers as well as believers to her colours, and showed great flexibility in how to use her power. Some of her political enemies will wish to ascribe to the worst features of modern policy as they see them the brand of Thatcherism, as a kind of evil spirit as they see it which they wish to warn us about years after the end of the era. That too is far from helpful, and may rebound against them as the public wearies of the continued attacks on a dead Prime Minister who cannot answer back.

Margaret Thatcher’s thought and actions changed substantially in many important areas over time. They can no longer change. Anyone who suggests he knows her mind on today’s problems has to make it up.

I am a realist. I understand others will continue to argue over her period in office, and some will seek to enlist her for their cause. In a later post I will examine what we do know of her views on current politics, from the words she said and wrote before she died.

European car sales continue to fall. There was a 10.7% decline in March, led by a 17.1% annual fall in Germany. France was down 16.2% and Spain 13.9%. UK sales were up 5.9%.

We have witnessed 18 months of falling European car sales (excluding the UK), with the latest figures showing an acceleration of the decline. The IMF has warned that Eurozone GDP will fall by 0.3% this year, which may prove optimistic. The Euro is forcing austerity policies onto the south and west of the zone. It is also impeding monetary growth in the weak countries. The Cyprus bank bankruptcy has n ot helped confidence, and has revealed the dangers of depositing money in weak banks in weak countries in the zone.

Meanwhile, after a period of good growth in employment in the UK, last month saw an unwelcome rise in unemployment, though the claimant count fell in March. Private sector pay is scarcely growing, at just 0.5%. Total pay is just 0.8% higher than a year earlier, with public sector pay continuing to rise faster than private sector. Public sector pay is up by 1.7%.

It looks as if the considerable attempts to ease money in the UK are still being held back by tough regulatory requirements on banks, and by delays to sorting out the balance sheets and loanbooks of the troubled banks with state involvement. Some money is now getting into the residential property sector, but some banks remain unwilling to lend new money for commercial property. The UK has scope to do more to ease the position, as it still has its own currency and monetary policy. It needs to sort out the troubled banks more quickly and thoroughly.

The IMF is going through a very bad period for economic forecasting, constantly forecasting second half recoveries in advanced countries that do not materialise. It is also at war with it self over whether spending cuts help or hinder economic progress. The IMF used to believe that high deficit countries had to cut. Now some of its people are querying this. They are finding it very difficult to understand and forecast the Eurozone, regularly being too optimistic on output and incomes.

As some of you wish to move on from the thoughts prompted by the funeral of Margaret Thatcher, let me give you this opportunity to do so.

In recent days gold has plunged in value. Some see this as the predictable decline of a barbarous relic. Why should it be so highly priced, they ask, when it only has value for adornment? Others see this as an unwelcome interruption to the steady climb of true money’s value, serving to highlight the way many Central Banks around the world actively debase their currencies in the now famous race to the bottom, the attempt to get trade advantage from competitive devaluation.

Gold’s critics say its high volatility show it is unsuited to return to a monetary role. Gold’s advocates claim its long rise in recent years has shown that the world would be a less inflationary place if gold returned to a role in our monetary system.

What are your thoughts now on the future role of gold? How do you explain the extreme price actions both on the way up and now on the way down?

         If there is one gift that Margaret Thatcher could give to her successors, it would for me be the gift of her honesty.

          Margaret was that rare and brave politician who told people how she thought things were, regardless of how that polled. She spent most of her long waking hours wrestling with the problems of the public. She mainly asked herself how she could right wrongs and make things work better.

          Of course she understood the need to present well. She spent endless hours trying to perfect each main speech. She cared about how the photos would look, and chose a good ad agency. All that came at the end of a project. It came after much work on how to solve the problem. If the answer to a trouble was politically difficult you did not drop the answer. You just had to argue an even better case.

           She was conscious of the polls but not ruled by them. She was told daily what the press and her  opponents were saying about her. We did not hold back the criticisms. She did not usually read it herself. She would think about whether a line of criticism was fair or worrying, whether she needed to do something about it or change the policy. She normally spared herself the unpleasant personal bitterness of much of the criticism in the form of the original article or cartoon. When Ministers suffered from sharp and unpleasant attacks, she always advsied them not to read them.

          She was well aware of the dangers of her forthright approach. She once told me that she was prepared for it by an old friend who had warned her that she would suffer  a barrage of personal abuse and criticism for what she was trying to do. Somehow knowing in advance allowed her to handle it when it came.

       She was also very brave. When she returned from one trip abroad she was asked why she was wearing sunglasses, as the critic thought they spoiled the pictures. Without affectation or flinching she said she had been warned to expect an attack during the walkabout. She simply said she  feared they would throw acid in her eyes, and she needed her   eyes to do her job.

           It is often easier to get into office than to be in power. The kind of politicians who are good at easing and charming their way into an official position, sometimes cannot remember why they wanted to be there by the time they make it. Some may never have had anything particular in mind to do. Some are happy to adopt whatever agenda the civil service, the EU or a past Minister left lying around for them. Some are soon hit by an unexpected crisis. Free of ideology in such circumstances can mean bereft of an  anchor or set of principles by  which to steer and judge.

         This was not true of Margaret Thatcher. She always knew there was a country to save and dragons to slay. She did not rest content with being the first woman Prime MInister, or feel that the state of the UK in 1979 was broadly acceptable, requiring just a little tinkering and bit of management. She wanted to create industrial peace in place of the endless strife. She wanted many more people to enjoy what had been the privileges of the few. She wanted to end inflation and make saving and investing worthwhile.  She wanted to tackle the communist threat from without. She was not radical when it came to the NHS or comprehensive schools or even welfare.

         My predecessor(but one)  at the Policy Unit, John Hoskyns, ran a small unit of three people. He specialised in the Union issue and helped her with the first important  steps towards Trade Union reform. He was often at variance with the official civil service and found getting into other matters than the central economic reform difficult. Taking over from Ferdy Mount, I inherited and recruited  a unit of ten people, with a remit to engage  with all policy areas with the exception of foreign affairs, and intelligence. The Prime Minister for her second Parliament in office, wanted better back up and analysis from a home team. I was careful to position and run  the unit as a civil service unit, with two official civil servants, two former Political Advisers, one former journalist,   three seconded business people, one person directly recruited from  from business,  and one recently retired senior accountant. We did not attend political meetings, nor brief the media (save for an occasional  background brief on big issues which I did for the lobby at Bernard Ingham’s request)

         I set about studying what the Prime Minister needed. Often she was called upon as a judge, to adjudicate between departments in dispute over an issue. In such a role she needed help in assessing the strength of the various cases put in, in establishing lines of questioning to probe the differences, and suggested criteria or principles for coming to a judgement.  Quite simply at times she needed a translation and precis service, to turn hundreds of pages of leaden civil service prose into something clear and focused for a busy woman.

         More importantly, I wanted to help her  to be strategic. She did not need to  intervene in dozens of issues where a Secrerary of State should be free to make his own decisions. I wanted to help her  influence or decide the big calls that would shape the government. I wanted her to ensure progress and success where the governing politicians had promised to take action as a Cabinet or political group. I also wanted her to be able  intervene to stop some legislation and administration that lobby groups or the civil service favoured which had no great cause behind it. All too often the so called apolitical ” necessary” or “tidying up”  bill sparked a bigger row than a very political measure, without delivering any great national gain.

        She agreed  that we would have a weekly bilateral meeting. I would send her a list of the main policies and actions being taken in each department and where they had got to. I would highlight major issues where the Manifesto had promised action or she had expressed a wish to do something. I would also list any bigger items planned by departments where I thought there could be political and financial cost for no obviously good reason.

           She liked this system. I always sought to arrange regular bilaterals for her with the  leading Secretaries of State, so they could be sure in private of any important view she held, and could tell her what they intended or explain why they were doing what they were doing. There had to be plenty of  private talking to ensure common aims and success.

           One of the nicest things she ever said after this system had been working for sometime was she welcomed the service the Policy Unit gave, because she could get so much more done.

       Let those who are never divisive cast the first stone.

       In some senses all democratic party politics are divisive, as parties seek to differentiate their policies and achievements from the others. The Church of England can also be divisive, when it decides to intervene in party political debates.

       The 1970s were no haven from divisions. I seem to remember the punitive tax and spend policies which forced us to borrow money from the IMF, and forced large public spending cuts on us as a result, were very divisive. So too was the winter of discontent, when the Trade Union movements turned against the wider public and against the Labour government.

      The noughties were also divisive. The Iraq war was bitterly opposed by many. The boom and bust policies were oopposed by a few of us in the boom phase, but by many when so many suffered from them in the bust phase. Bankers were then made the scapegoats for a wider failure of the government, Central Bank and regulators as well as of the bankers.