Author: johnredwood

 

The lobbying bill before the Commons has upset 38 degrees and some other  campaigning groups. They argue that if enacted it will limit the freedom for charities to campaign about political matters.

Their arguments seem to be based on a misunderstanding of the current law and of the intents of the Bill. Under present election law a third party cannot normally spend money on promoting an individual candidate or political party during an election period, without the permission of the candidate or party. The  cost they incur in such a promotion rightly has to be part of the approved budget of that candidate or party, and properly reported like all party expenditure in an election period. The Lobbying Bill reasserts but does not change this fundamental point.

Nor does the Bill seek to change the rules on charities. Under charity law they are not entitled to give money donated for their charitable purpose to a political party. They cannot intervene directly in an election with charitable money, but they are entitled to undertake politcal campaigning relevant to and in support of their charitable aims and objectives. None of this is changed by the Bill. Some readers of this blog might want the Bill to make it more difficult for charities to be involved in politics, but this is not the aim of this particular piece of legislation.

If a third party  wanted to support my candidature, because they support my views on a topic or range of issues, they would have to approach my Election Agent and agree what they would spend and how that spending would be controlled and reported. Anything they spent for me would come off the permitted total I am allowed to spend.  Without such a rule campaign spending limits would be meaningless, as candidates and parties could simply operate through tame third parties and spend more. It is and will remain an election offence to spend money on promotion without authorisation and without reporting it to the authorities after the election.

The Bill reminds third parties of these rules, and reduces the limits they are allowed to spend on promoting  parties.  It is silent on the definition of charitable purposes, which will remain as before.  Many people who give money to charity think a charity should keep out of party politics altogether, and would not think it appropriate for a charity to back a certain party or certain candidates.  The Bill does not change charity law concerning charities involvement in campaigning politics. Again it has always been illegal for a charity to make its main purpose political, but it is and remains legal for it to try to influence government and Parliament on matters relevant to its primary charitable purpose.

I hope constituents who have written to me about this mater using the 38 degrees email will be reassured by the nature and intent of the Bill. I hope you will agree that charities should not be vehicles for promoting political parties and candidates in elections. I also hope people will understand there does need to be a  framework of election law which applies to everyone  so that campaign spending limits can be enforced. The Bill does reduce the amount a third party can spend on the campaign in England to a maximum of £319,800. It also increases the amount of permitted expenditure for a third party in an individual constituency from £500 to £700 without authorisation of the Election Agent.

 

The Foreign Office has always had a passion to give in to anything European. They seem to see more EU government as a good in itself, and the UK’s destiny. They have been overwhelmed by pessimism about an independent UK, and by a love of the power the EU gives to officials at the expense of electors and their elected Ministers.

The new UK foreign policy we need would be based around the construction of a new relationship with the EU. That relationship would be based on trade and mutual co-operation where it made sense to do so. It would be outside the federalist treaties. It would restore the UK’s right to an independent foreign policy, borders policy, criminal justice system and much else.

The UK would have a new financial deal which allowed us to keep more of our own money, and took us out of the financial obligations of the EU Treaties.  We would  regain control of our own waters and fishing grounds.

The new relationship would still see the UK seeking to influence the EU and building alliances with it on matters of common concern. We would meet their standards for exports of goods and services to them, but be free to choose our own which might be different for our own domestic market and for other overseas trade.

The policy would require us to rebuild a complete chain of embassies and Ambassadors for the whole world, no longer relying on some EU Embassies to represent us. It would also of course free us of our share of the joint costs of the EU diplomatic service.  Any common defence commitments and interests with our EU neighbours would be handled through NATO, not through the EU.

Negotiating this should be the prime task of the FCO for the next three years.

 

         There have been some absurd statements and articles about the way the UK will cease to have influence, now we have decided not to use force against Syria.  If anything, the contrary is true. We have a better platform now to influence the debate in the US, and to play a bigger role in diplomacy and peace brokering.

          The idea that we will lose influence is based on the preposterous Foreign Office and Chatham House doctrine that the UK only has influence in the world if it agrees with any proposal the USA puts forward, and only has influence in the EU if it agrees with everything the Commission wants. Clearly the authors of this dogma do not understand the meaning of the word “influence”. Were the US Congress now to turn down the idea of military intervention in Syria, that would indeed show the influence of the UK Parliament on world affairs.

          If the UK receives a phone call from the USA telling us what they plan to do by way of military intervention, and we agree to help, we have not had any influence over the decision. If the EU tells us we will turn up a discuss a new law on a stated topic when we have no wish for any such law, we have no influence. The establishment insiders confuse “influence” with “inside knowledge of an other’s intentions” which they like to have. It is easiest to get this inside information if you always agree with its impact on you and do not “make trouble” by disagreeing. The UK in the last decade just seemed to give in or go along with anything coming from either Washington or Brussels.

                  Some of them argue that if we accept the strategic decisions of the US/EU, we can then have some influence over the detail of how it is done. That may be possible, but it also may not work. We are either in the position where we have a little influence over the tactics, but none over the strategy, or in the position where we are simply taking dictation from a  superior power.

                If we want to have more influence over what happens in  foreign policy in the wider world then we need to have our own often distinctive policy, and argue for it through NATO, the UN, with our US ally and the rest. We will have influence when we have a good proposal backed up by good arguments. We will have influence when we command votes at the UN, or support within NATO, or persuade the US to our position.

                  When it comes to having “influence in and through the EU” that was made extremely difficult by the abolition of many vetoes over policy. It is far easier to influence an EU policy or law if you have a veto, than if you are inside and likely to be crushed by majority voting. The Foreign Office gravely weakened this country and its scope to influence events by so heavily backing Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon. That is why we need to put a new relationship with the EU at the heart of  our policy. A new relationship with the EU is the only way to re-establish an independent UK policy.

 

            Mr Obama has shown wisdom in asking Congress for approval of any military strike against Syria. His words were well chosen. Correctly identifying the American public, like the British public, as war weary, he ascribed to them a good motive. He said they understood the USA cannot resolve the deep and ancient conflicts of Syria by bombing.

            That is exactly the main point some of us were making in the Commons on Thursday. Far from marginalising the UK or rewriting the UK’s future role as a non power, our debate has clearly sparked some new thinking in the Oval Office. The President referred to our vote. He either wants the US Congress to do the same, to get him off the hook, or for the US Congress to explain and define a military action he could take that could unite the American people again behind such intervention.

            I think the US Congress will find it difficult to overcome well based war weariness by the American people. It is now their shared political challenge with the President, who understands in a  democracy you need broad support if you are to visit death and destruction on other countries, however evil their governments.

            Those of us who did not support limited  cruise missile attacks on Syria did so for the best of reasons. Such attacks can kill the innocent as well as the guilty, they can harden the resolve of bad men, and they can get in the way of the eventual political process needed to resolve Syria’s internal conflicts. Sometimes you have to tell your “closest ally” just that, and sometimes he is wise enough to listen.

 

          It is difficult following the hourly changes of mood, changes of mind and final decisions from outside the Commons, when it is having one of its active and important couple of days.

          Thursday was a good day for our democracy. We were discussing something of major importance. We, the UK Parliament could make the decision without having to genuflect to EU law. The government rightly understood it had to win the consent of the House before it could embark on any  course of action toward Syria. MPs were well aware of the sceptical mood in the country towards another Middle Eastern military commitment.

          The context is the disagreement between Mr Hague and many Conservative  MPs prior to the recess over arming the rebels in Syria. We urged the government in private and public not to do this. 81 of us wrote to the Prime Minister before the recess saying Parliament should be recalled if the government wished to change its policy on Syria and arm the rebels or intervene in the conflict.  

         When the recall came it was clear there had been a major rethink by the government. They were prepared to say they now agreed with us in many respects. They ruled out arming the rebels. They even ruled out seeking to intervene in the conflict in any way to change the balance of forces. They said now their sole wish was to retaliate on behalf of the world community against the use of chemical weapons. We welcomed the change of approach on the policies of not arming the rebels and not seeking to change the balance of forces on the ground.

             The Conservative party did not have time for the normal consultations and exchanges over the new policy of retaliation. By the time most MPs arrived back at Westminster the government looked confident it could secure support for a limited military intervention because the PM had briefed the Leader of the Opposition and he seemed to support the initiative. He had been briefed that it would be a  legal and proportionate response. With Labour support the Conservative and Lib Dem leaderships did not need to worry too much about their backbenchers. Clearly legal advice had been taken, which had indicated other types of military intervention posed legal difficulties.

           Late on Wednesday afternoon, just before Thursday’s debate, Labour announced they could not after all support the government. The idea of tabling a motion which gave the government full power to undertake military intervention was no longer possible, as there were too many potential  rebels to leave any chance of success. The government set about the task of drafting a motion which could win back Labour, and at the same time might be more palatable to maybe 100 Conservative backbenchers and 20 Lib Dems who were not happy with the idea of using force.

          The government hit on the idea that the crucial vote to authorise force would be delayed until next week, after the UN  Inspectors had reported. That reduced the numbers of rebels considerably for the first vote, but did not satisfy Mr Miliband. As Thursday wore on more and more Conservative MPs declared privately to Ministers and whips or in public and in the Commons chamber that they could not  vote for any motion next week  to authorise force. By mid evening  it was clear the case for using force had been lost by a large margin. The more the government worked at persuading colleagues to support them, the more MPs declared they were against the use of force.  The final vote on the government’s bland motion looked decisive from outside, but in practice the policy many of us disliked had died hours before as the numbers of MPs against force built up rapidly. We already knew before 10 o clock there would be no further motion to authorise force.

                Some MPs and commentators still think Ministers can take the country to war without the support of Parliament. It is true that some past wars have taken place without a Commons vote. There was no Commons vote because the Commons was united in favour. Whilst technically Ministers can sign Treaties and issue orders to our armed forces, in practice they can only do so when they know they have the confidence and the majority of the Commons behind them. On Thursday Parliament reminded any future government that in these weighty matters Ministers can only proceed when MPs let them.

          If a government  wishes to take the country to war, it needs more consent than for a civil policy, not less, given the sacrifices required of many from such a decision.  If the Opposition is not in agreement the government can still do it, but it needs to have the full support of its own side and to understand the risks that it could split the country over such a crucial matter. It is best only to do it when all main parties are united, to give the best possible chance of success. Officers can then command  their troops safe in the knowledge that whoever they voted for probably agreed with their action and purpose. If A war begins with a major row at home it does give the military personnel a great send off.

 

         The assertion of Parliamentary authority has rewritten UK foreign policy towards Syria and the wider Middle East. It provides a welcome opportunity to question whether we need a more general review and change.   Over the next few days I will look at the options and problems.  My general view is that we should have a more muscular and independent policy within the EU, and be more discerning about which UN and US led ventures we join. We should put UK national interests and the interests of our related territories and countries and the Commonwealth in more central positions.

         Let us begin with our relationship with the USA. Some are complaining that Parliament’s opposition to military intervention in Syria means the UK is no longer an important world power, sitting at the top table with the USA. They assert we will no longer be  party to the best  secrets of the world’s policeman. The advocates of the “special relationship” with the USA are worrying that the relationship has been badly damaged, as the UK has “to sit out” the Syrian action.

           Much of this is based on a UK misconception. The special relationship was not very special when we needed it most. The USA did not join the war in 1939 and gave us precious little help during the darkest days of the early war. The USA stopped the pursuit of our policy towards Egypt and the Suez Canal in 1956. The USA was far from helpful as we set about the task of recapturing the Falklands Islands. Successive Presidents have often wanted to  pushed the UK more into the EU than is good for us or than we desire.  In return we did not commit forces to the USA’s ill judged Viet Nam war. Thanks mainly to the EU we do not have a free trade agreement with the USA.

          The truth is whatever the aims and views of successive Presidents and Prime Minsters, there will always be very strong links across the Atlantic. The shared language and literature, the large mutual investments in each other’s industry and commerce, the bonds of kinship provide a stable base for other networks. When a President and PM like each other and have a similar political outlook, there can be very close working across the Atlantic on policy and government matters. There will always be many Americans who see the UK as the cradle and partial architect of their democracy, just as many of us will continue to admire greatly the work and words  of the Founding fathers, the achievements of a great society in the pursuit of liberty and happiness.

         The UK needs to understand that there will be times when we disagree or are not useful to the USA. We have to accept that France, for example, may wish to be close to the US over Syrian intervention when we do not. We should not be frightened of telling the USA that we do not agree or wish to sit out a particular intervention or policy, just as they do if we have a need or an idea they do not like. We should press on with a free trade agreement with the USA and explain to the USA why the UK does intend to have a new and looser relationship with the rest of the EU. We are not in the EU to be the voice that tries to moderate EU policies in the US interest.

          To some of us Mr Obama has been a disappointment. He promised to close Guantanamo, but has not done so. He promised to trust diplomacy more and war less in the Middle East, but ended up increasing the military commitment to Afghanistan.  We need to be thinking of who might take over from him, and have our new foreign policy ready to woo and wow them. It has to be a policy more suited to our needs, and less desperate about preserving the outward show of a “special relationship”.

Mr John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con): We make no more important decision in this House than to give permission to our armed forces to unleash some of their formidable arsenal. We should only do so if we feel there is democratic consent for the aim and the purpose of the conflict, and we should do so only if it is legal so to do. In my adult lifetime in politics I think that we, as a country, have intervened too often. We have too often asked our armed forces to do things that armed forces alone cannot do. I am not against all intervention. Of course, when we had to liberate Kuwait or the Falkland Islands, they were noble aims. Our armed forces performed with great skill and bravery, and the British public were behind them. We must be very careful, however, not to inject them into a civil war where we do not know the languages, where we have uncertain sympathy for the cultures and the conflicting groups involved, and where the answer in the end has to be a political process in the country itself and not external force.

I therefore welcome strongly the three things the Government have set out. I welcome this debate and the fact that we will do things democratically. It is our job to speak for our constituents and, if there is to be military activity, to ensure that the British public will it—they certainly do not at the moment. I welcome very much the Government’s statement that we will not arm the rebels. That is huge progress and I support that fully.

Mr Graham Stuart (Beverley and Holderness) (Con): Does my right hon. Friend agree that what we would like to hear from the Deputy Prime Minister when he sums up later is a clear statement that the Government believe that in all future cases military action—immediate external assault—will not be entered into unless this House has given its say-so first?

Mr Redwood: Of course I agree with that. Any sensible Government would do that, because what Government can commit our armed forces without the implicit or actual support of the House of Commons? That can be tested at any time, so no Government would be so foolish as to try and proceed without it.

Mrs Cheryl Gillan (Chesham and Amersham) (Con): Will my right hon. Friend just go a bit further and agree that anybody going through the Government Lobby tonight is not giving their approval for direct military intervention on behalf of the UK, and that the Deputy Prime Minister should make that very, very clear in his summing up tonight? There will be another vote.

Mr Redwood: I leave the Deputy Prime Minister to speak for himself and the Government.

The third thing I welcome is that the Government are not trying to influence the conflict. That is an important new development, although I am not sure how it marries with possible military intervention. If military intervention is planned, I presume that it will be against Assad and his forces and that, of course, would have some impact on the conflict. That impact might be in the direction that the Government and others wish to go, but they need to accept that there is a possible contradiction or ambiguity between their wish not to have an impact on the balance of forces in Syria and their wish to intervene over the issue of chemical weapons.

Everyone in the House shares the Government’s horror at the use of chemical weapons and the brutality shown, perhaps by the regime. It is quite possible that the regime used them. I agree with right hon. and hon. Members from both sides who have pointed out that there have also been atrocities and horrors enough without chemical weapons—those should also shock our consciences and worry our emotions, and they do.

Given the understandable wish to respond to the use of horror weapons, we need to ask whether the Government could undertake, or assist others to undertake, a military intervention that would fulfil the purpose. That should be the only question. Of course I understand that the Government cannot come to the House and debate a series of targets with us in advance—that would be folly. However, I hope that the House can help steer Ministers to ask the right questions of their advisers about whether there is any type of military intervention that could make the position better rather than worse.

The military experts to whom I have talked say that the last thing we want to do is shower down bombs or cruise missiles on stocks of chemical weapons; that would degrade them, but could let them out as well. It would be a dreadful tragedy if, in an attempt to stop, by destruction, the use of chemical weapons, we infected people in the surrounding areas. That does not sound like a good idea. Bombing the factories might have a similar consequence, although perhaps the risk would not be as great as bombing the stocks of chemical weapons.

Is the idea to bomb the soldiers and their commanders who might use the weapons? That could be a way. However, we would have to ask the Government how many soldiers and officers we would need to kill to guarantee more or less that Assad would not use the weapons again. I fear that the answer might be very many, given that we are dealing with someone as mad and bad as Assad. Would we want to go that far? Are we sure that it would work?

Is the idea to bomb a load of buildings, preferably when people were not in them, so that we destroyed the command headquarters or military installations? That would be possible; western forces have done such things in other situations, normally as preparation for invasion. Again, however, how many would we need to bomb to make sure that Assad never used chemical weapons again?

I hope that the Government will think very carefully about the issues. If they wish to persuade the British people, who are mightily sceptical about our ability to find the right military response to stop Assad and his horrors, they need to come up with some answers privately and find the language to explain to Members, and the public we represent, why they have every confidence that we can achieve the noble aim of stopping Assad from using chemical weapons.

I wish the Government well. If they really can come up with a way of stopping Assad murdering his own people, nobody will be happier than me. Everyone in the House would be extremely happy. But the Government have to understand the scepticism of the British people. Assad is mad and bad and it will not be easy to stop him. I fear that we will not be able to do it in a half-hearted manner with a few cruise missiles in the hope that he will not retaliate.

 

             Yesterday Conservative MPs queued up in Parliament to question or oppose the Coalition government’s strategy towards Syria. The day ended with the good  news that the government accepts the will of Parliament and the view of the British people, that we should not intervene militarily in the conflict.

             It all began with the Conservative MPs who opposed the idea of arming the rebels. We said that Parliament had to be convened and consulted before any change of policy towards Syria when it was suggested the government might start to arm the rebels once the summer recess started. The government announced yesterday that it now agrees we should not  arm the rebels and should not seek to intervene in the Syrian civil war, save for the question of how to respond to the use of chemical weapons. It ended when Mr Miliband  made clear that Labour would vote against early military action even on the chemical weapons matter.

             Once Labour’s support for action was removed when Mr Miliband changed his mind, the government drafted a motion which made it clear a further vote would be needed before any UK military involvement could be undertaken. As the debate and soundings continued yesterday, it became obvious that an attempt next week to push for such a vote after the UN Inspectors have reported was likely to lead to a substantial defeat. As it turned out the government did not even have a majority for its general motion condemning the use of chemical weapons, proposing further diplomatic efforts at the UN  and leaving open other options.

             I will post my speech in the Commons later today.

 

            I am glad the Prime Minister listened to Parliament when we said we wanted a debate and vote before any change of policy towards Syria. As I expected he has kept his promise.

             It is now Parliament’s task to rise to the occasion.  Parliament needs to bring its experience and knowledge to bear on the difficult moral, political and military issues before us.

              It seems the debate and the possible change of policy has emerged from the President’s difficulty  over his red lines statement. Mr Obama promised or threatened action if Assad started to use chemical weapons against his people. Earlier uses of chemical weapons were ignored. The latest, owing to its scale and media prominence, has become the possible cause of a  missile attack on Syria. The President’s threat did not work, so now he has to decide what to do about it. Is there any reason to suppose a limited missile strike will mend the ways of the Syrian government?

               The debate is framed in narrow terms by the western governments. In their terms we still need to satisfy ourselves that this latest chemical weapon atrocity occurred at the hands of the regime and not someone else. We need to satisfy ourselves that it would be legal under international law to unleash conventional weapons in retaliation for chemical weapon use. We need to ensure that if our cruise missiles are used against the stocks of chemical weapons or the production facilities that the Assad regime has, their deployment will not trigger the release of large quantities of dangerous chemicals. We need to ask how much damage has to be done to the Assad regime to ensure he does not use chemical weapons again. We also would be wise to ask if all this can be done without harming Syrians who are not part of the regime and its military capabilities. We need to think about the reasons for Chinese and Russian opposition to any such action, and to consider what they might do if the west ignores their advice not to intervene.

            I think we should also ask wider questions. I find the continued use of bombs and shells from military planes, tanks and artillery pieces against a civilian population and urban settlements shocking and morally repugnant,  as I find the use of chemical weapons morally repugnant. Can we really say it is just the use of chemical weapons that needs special responses?  Why do we ignore the one, and  act against the other?  Will our intervention make some difference to the longevity of the Syrian regime or  can we agree with the government briefing that the intention is not to affect the balance between the Syrian government and the rebels?  Why is regime change ruled out as an aim, when western governments have such a poor view of the Syrian regime? Why has  the UK government changed its mind from its previous suggestions that arming the rebels was necessary to speed the end of the regime?  

             Many of us are appalled by the violence and chaos in Syria. We would dearly love to see peace restored. We do not see an easy way for the west to bring this about. We do see how partial military interventions might make things worse. In the end these civil wars have to be resolved by the participants agreeeing to sort out their differences by negotiation rather than by fighting.