Author: johnredwood

Today the government’s favourite think tank is being given air time to tell us how important migrants are to our economy. It is true that in the boom time migrants often came here to do jobs others were unwilling to do. The government made the labour market much less flexible for people born here, through its new labour laws, and its tax and benefit regime. The evidence of that is there to see in the 5 million people of working age who do not have a job. It offset this inflexibility to some extent by inviting in large numbers of migrant and temporary workers. That was better than leaving the economy ossified , but not as good as making the UK labour market strong enough and flexibile enough to get many more people back to work or into work for the first time.

Now we are entering a very unpleasant downturn, brought on by government waste and overborrowing, as well as by the loose monetary policy of past years and the overborrowing in the private sector, the market will partly adjust by some migrants going elsewhere where there are better job opportunities.Nonetheless, there will be all too many job losses, and some rise in overall unemployment, as the economic winter sets in. The inward migrantion kept wages down at a time of boom, and will offset some of the job losses in times of downturn, but not all of them.

What will the government do to show it is tackling the problems of joblessness and income squeeze? It will spend and spend, as it still does not realise governemnt over spending is much of the reason why the UK is in such a poor position to correct the excesses of past years of easy money.It will offer one off help this winter with fuel bills and maybe with food bills. It will seek to augment people’s income in the short term by borrowing more money which the same people will have to help repay with interest in later years! At a time when people struggle to get a mortgage or afford a mortgage to buy themselves a home we will all be forced to help pay for a collective mortgage to offer sops to people faced with a struggle to pay the family bills.What we need is a governemnt which can deliver much more for less, and eave us more of our own money to pay the bills.

The government should be more cautious. Offering benefits rather than tax cuts is an expensive and complicated way of easing the squeeze, involving too sets of extra officials to collect the money in and then dish it out. Doing it all on borrowing risks the ultimate wrath of the markets. This autumn the government will have to come out with revised figures, showing just how much above its own budget its current spending now is, and revealing just how much worse both spending and revenue looks in the months ahead thanks to much slower growth than forecast. If the government is honest in its figures it will help, but the figures will be bad. If it understates them it will undermine market confidence even more, as markets are getting ready for a lot of red ink in the government’s budget. The more red ink there is, the worse the downturn and the longer will recovery be delayed.

Today we will hear a statement from the Chancellor announcing a much heralded statement offering up to £50 billion of near cash to the banks in return for some of their mortgages.

How is this done?
The government itself will borrow the money, by issuing bonds – IOUs – on the taxpayer.It will lend this money to the banks. It will secure these loans with banks’ mortgages. It will require a discount on the mortgages – in other words it will accept the mortgages for say 90 pence for every pound of mortgage. This discount will give us, the taxpayers, some protection against mortgages within the packages of loans that go wrong and are not repaid, and against failure to pay the interest on some of them. After the transactions the banks have £50 billion more of government bonds which can easily be sold in the market for cash, whilst the government has security of around £55billion of mortgages. The interest received on the mortgages should exceed the interest on the loans. The government/Bank will ask for top up of security if the values of mortgages continue to fall.
The taxpayer will not be out of pocket if the government judge it correctly, but the taxpayer will be at some small risk until the transactions are unwound once the crisis has gone away. At some point the government and taxpayer have to get rid of the mortgages again and repay the borrowings with which they have paid for the loans based on them.The exact arrangement is more akin to loans to the commercial banks, which gives the taxpayer more protection than buying the mortgages.

Good news or bad news? Will it sort out the mortgage market?
This transaction will of itself help in alleviating the shortage of cash in markets, and on its own should lead to new lending by the mortgage banks. As the mortgage banks acquire more cash/short term government bonds so they can lend more money to people seeking mortgages. It was a shortage of cash to meet depositors requirements and the lack of confidence in Northern Rock that led to the run on the Rock. If money and government bonds had been available like this in September 2007 there would not have been a run on the Rock.

However, it has to be seen in context. There are at least three other considerations which will limit the impact this helpful proposal will have:

1. At the same time the authorities are tightening regulation of the banks, demanding that they keep more cash on deposit at the Bank of England for any given amount of lending. Every pound of additional cash they have to keep cuts the value of this package, as it becomes a circular process. The authorities demand more cash for security from the banks. The banks do not have such cash. The authorities then give them the cash to meet the tougher requirements. No-one can borrow an extra penny, as the new cash is frozen.
2. The larger banks are international. Whilst the money will be offered to the UK subsidiary and intended for the UK mortgage market, in practise international banks look at the balance of their global business. Not all of the extra money, after allowing for bigger reserve requirements, will necessarily find its way into the UK mortgage market.
3. The UK market still has the problem of Northern Rock, which remains a negative influence on reviving the mortgage market because the government nationalised it. If instead of nationalising Northern had been offered this kind of support, it could now be offering new loans on a significant scale. Because it is under strict controls to repay the £24 billion taxpayer debt, and under strict surveillance not to be too competitive as a subsidised bank, it cannot play an important role in reviving the mortgage market in the UK.

So will it work?
It is a helpful package. Whether it is enough depends on how much further the authorities go in tightening reserve and cash requirements, and how quickly they want the Northern Rock money back.

THE £50 BILLION PACKAGE FOR THE BANKS WOULD HAVE SAVED NORTHERN ROCK IF INTRODUCED LAST AUTUMN.

If the government and Bank of England can make £50 billion available to the banks today to get the mortgage market going again, why couldn’t they have done that last September to prevent the Northern Rock crisis?

This latest move completes their extraordinary U turn from wrongly saying there would be no bail-outs or help for the banks last September, to now adding a £50billion money market package to the £100 billion nationalisation of Northern Rock. British taxpayers uniquely in the world have double trouble – we are paying for the credit crunch twice, just as we seem to pay twice for everything else this government attempts. We are likely to lose money on the nationalisation, and have very overstretched public accounts thanks to this double borrowing whammy. The irony of the UK position is the government is seeking to sort out overlending by the mortgage banks by overborrowing itself!

If £50 billion had been made available last September there would have been no run on Northern Rock. That unhappy institution would not now be owned by taxpayers, responsible for shedding at least one third of the staff and fighting a legal argument over competition law with the EU. It would not now be running its business down and struggling to repay a massive £25billion loan from the taxpayer. Instead confidence could have been restored with this kind of package last autumn.

The latest scheme – £50 billion of government debt to swap for mortgages – is a better way of helping than clumsy and expensive nationalisation. The reported timings are clever – one year bonds to avoid proper balance sheet accounting for the government, three year duration for the mortgage banks to get the government through the next election before the reckoning. The £50 billion scheme, if properly designed, will be better value for taxpayers than the nationalisation, and will help all banks in the UK, not just one. It is not without its dangers, but at least it does not make the taxpayer responsible for all the staff, loans and liabilities of all the other banks in the way we are for Northern Rock.

The history of the Northern Rock crisis can be followed on www.johnredwod.com, under the Northern Rock tab. Items are in chronological order.

Governments are changing their position over banking regulation. When the credit crunch first struck, they were cautious and said there was no point in seeking to bolt the stable door after the horse had gone. As banks were now trying to recover from a weak position and were risk averse there was no need to strengthen controls over risk taking.

As the credit crunch has carried on its weary way there is a growing impatience as regulators feel they ought to be saying something as a prelude to doing something. We are now in to “This must never happen again” territory, allied to a view that there must be seen to be a toughening of regulation after the problems of sub prime and beyond.

There is the usual regulatory syllogism. Banking is a well regulated industry. Banking has just got into a mess. Therefore we need more regulation.

It does not flow. The truth is that the detailed regulation of banking under Basel 1 encouraged banks to put risks off balance sheet and to securitise. It was their enthusiasm for doing this that led to the well publicised problems at certain institutions. Left to their own devices to assess capital adequacy, they might not have gone so far in those directions – the regulatory sums allowed them more leeway and gave a sense of false security. No self respecting banker would be seen to have substantially more capital than the regulator thought was necessary. Northern Rock was discussing how to reduce its capital surplus under current rules before the run began.

There are currently three preferred options on offer for re-regulation of the banks. Each one has a role to play when we are coming out of the credit crunch, but each one if imposed too strictly and too soon could make getting out of the crunch more difficult.

1. More transparency. Usually more transparency, more published information about the state of a company, is a good thing. It acts as discipline on the company, and allows others to assess how much business to do with that company. However, when there are fears about bank weaknesses, a sudden rush to publish more may fuel the fears rather than reassure. Different banks will have taken a different line on how to value assets, how to assess liabilities, and how much capital cover they need. Changing the numbers or flooding out new numbers at or near the low point of the cycle could damage.

2. Mark to market. Some say the way to ensure clarity and comparability over banking numbers is to require all banks to mark the values of their assets and liabilities to market. That means that if they hold bonds, shares and bonds in securitised vehicles, packages of mortgages or the like, these should have a market value and that should be used in declaring the bank’s position. Again, this is a good idea in normal times, but in these conditions it could lead to a rush to the bottom. If bank A has to mark its holdings down a lot by marking to the new lower market prices, then it may have to start selling some of the assets to buttress its position. This could drive the market price down further, leading to more weakening in its balance sheet position. If the bank intends to hold the assets until maturity or for a reasonable length of time, making them mark them to market now could be disruptive. They need to be examined in private on a case by case basis where they wish to deviate from marking to market, if necessary in conjunction with the regulator to see fair play. There is no necessity to value a bond or mortgage at a low market price if the bank can and will hold it to maturity and get full repayment.

3. Require more regulatory capital to allow for the risks of a future credit crunch and difficulty in raising money market funds. Again this would be a prudent decision, but at the moment when banks are working hard to ensure proper balance sheet rations and liquidity for current tough conditions, an added requirement would be far from helpful and would delay recovery.

Stephen Lewis (Insinger de Beaufort)has recently written a good piece examining the IMF’s claim to be the obvious choice for a new world super regulator role over the banks. He shows how the IMF in the run up to the recent credit crunch was reporting that systemic risk was low, and was not warning people that we were about to enter the worst conditions in money markets for at least 35 years. He too is concerned, as an experienced analyst of money markets and a City expert, that overdoing the extra regulation at this point could impede recovery. This is becoming a serious and long running credit crunch. The work of the authorities around the world should concentrate on rebuilding confidence and liquidity. That should not include subsidising banks or taking on unreasonable risks from the banking sector, and it should certainly not include nationalising banks. It should include taking action to make markets more liquid and buying assets from banks at prices that mean the taxpayer does not lose.

The originate and distribute model, where banks arrange loans and mrotgages and then sell on packages of these loans to others, was a way designed to reduce the risk to the banks, and a method to allow them to extend more credit. As Mr Lewis argues, this was not such a bad idea when done sensibly. It would be a pity if such practises were made impossible in future, as it could limit credit growth more than is desiarable.

Today someone of the radio told us that the credit crunch was easing in the UK wholesale markets, and intensifying on the High Street.

That’s what you should expect to happen. Banks and Building Societies are getting the message from the money markets that they cannot carry on lending so much. That’s why they are withdrawing their attractive mortgage offers, putting up rates and demanding larger deposits. They need to rebuild their margins (make more profit and protect themselves from loss) at a time when they cannot borrow cheaply in large amounts on the money markets, and cannot sell the same volume of mortgages on to others in the way they could in 2006. They need to husband cash and make more profit to deal with the write offs on past business and to combat the changed conditions they are experiencing for raising money to lend on.

As they withdraw their High Street offers, or ration them by price and deposit requirements, so their demand for extra funds from the money market declines. As a result, money market rates have started to come down, to get closer to the Bank of England’s rate that has been an academic irrelevance for much of the time since the crisis struck.

Some of the money market reaction is a question of timing. Banks and mortgage companies need to be more careful at a quarter or year end, and can relax a bit mid month. Some is more fundamental, reflecting the big decline in credit being offered to consumers, reducing the banks’ total need for cash.

It is by this mechanism that the credit crisis will move from hitting the financial sector, to hitting the consumers. All those who took pleasure in some well paid City types getting into difficulties and maybe facing cancelled bonuses or something worse, will now see that this is a crisis that will hit others too who were nothing to do with the credit explosion. The first casualties of the UK credit crunch will be first time buyers who will not have access to the same proportion of the selling price of a property on the same favourable terms as their predecessors in 2006/7.

There is a two way pull in the UK housing market at the moment. The price falls of the last few months have been small on average. The epicentre of the decline so far seems to have been some new flats in some city centres where developers had done well with their selling prices not so long ago, and where there is now excess supply. Some say the continuing pressure from new households, and the shortage of new build will keep prices up. They point out that interest rates are still much lower than in the last housing price decline. Others point out that whilst interest rates are lower, house prices are so much higher so mortgage payments are also very high. A one percentage increase in the mortgage on the base of say a 5% rate is a 20% increase in interest cost for the individual or couple concerned. If that is charged on a high house price and mortgage that can be very painful to the mortgage holder.

Whilst it is true that there are more people who want to buy a home here, that only keeps the market up and prices rising if it can be translated into effective demand through such people obtaining mortgages. There are always more people who want a first home or a bigger and better home than there are homes available. Prices sort out the imbalance in the market, limiting most people’s ambitions by the reality that the house they might like most is simply too dear. We are entering a period when more people are going to have more limitation placed on their ambition to own a home or a better home, because there is going to be a painful shortage of mortgage funds.

In these conditions prices on average are likely to come down. That is also part of the painful process of adjusting after a long period of inflationary credit has been let loose in the system. Falling house prices bring other economic problems in their wake. If fewer people move the demand for carpets, curtains and new furnishings will take a knock from that source. If people feel less rich because their main asset is no longer appreciating, then they will spend less on luxuries. As people pay more interest on the mortgage, so they have less income to spend on other items, as the mortgage interest is like a tax – you have to pay it or else. It’s all part of the economic slowdown most economists are now forecasting.

PS: Since writing this post I have seen the Halifax house price index for March. That shows a 2.5% fall on average in March 2008, taking the annual average increase down to just 1.1% despite the strong start to the last twelve months. It also reveals that the West Midlands and Wales are leading the market down, with London overall still up. I can’t see house prices suddenly reversing this downturn in the national average that has shown up so strikingly in the last month in this index.

Just as we have seen a rush by mortgage companies to put their rates up, so they are not left as the cheapest on offer facing a deluge of applicants, so we are now seeing a rush to withdraw mortgage products altogether as mortgage companies struggle with the volume of demand.

Individual companies are right to stress they are withdrawing products and increasing prices because they are inundated in the wake of Northern Rock’s withdrawal from the market, not because they have run out of money. The system as a whole, however, is cutting back on its volumes because it is rightly being more cautious about how much money it can raise from different sources. The Credit Crunch is having a real impact at last – it means less money for banks and Building Societies as a whole to lend, which means fewer mortgages, lower proportions of the house value being advanced and higher interest rates (relative to market rates).
This in turn will mean lower house prices.

The rest is covered by yesterday’s post entitled “Are all mortgages wicked?”

Today a leading mortgage company has announced it is withdrawing for the time being from making any new mortgage advances. This follows hard on the heels of the government’s decision to halve the amount Northern Rock has lent on mortgage over the next couple of years in order to repay the money owing to taxpayers.

In recent days mortgage rates have been rising, even though the Bank of England’s message on interest rates has been to keep them the same. As one or two mortgage companies find they are offering the lowest mortgage rates, so they are inundated with people seeking a good value mortgage. They are forced by the rush into putting up their rates, only to leave another mortgage company exposed to the rush. It is going to be a difficult time for people seeking a mortgage, and a more difficult time for those with a variable rate mortgage, facing higher interest payments as a result.

Today Parliament will be debating mortgages on a Liberal Democrat motion. The LDs have been saying for some time that people in the UK have borrowed too much, and have been urging action to curb private sector borrowings. Presumably they wanted higher interest rates sooner, to choke off some of the mortgage demand, and probably want tougher regulations to make it more difficult for people on low incomes or with few assets to borrow.

I certainly opposed Gordon Brown’s decision to tinker with monetary policy by changing targets for inflation from the RPI to the CPI. It meant the Bank of England had to set lower rates in the run up to the 2005 election than if they had kept the old target, and did mean more credit was extended. If the government had stuck with the RPI, and had kept a better control over its own borrowings, we would be better placed to weather the current financial storm.

I do not, however, share the LD view that things should be made a lot tougher for those on low incomes or with no cash for a deposit to buy a home. Home ownership is rightly much sought after, and is an important part of an English person’s liberty. Once someone owns a home they make decisions about their private space in a way tenants cannot, and they have an asset which usually goes up in price which brings them greater financial independence as the years progress. There can be little worse financially than facing old age with no home that you own – it means you pay the highest rents of your life at the end of your life when you have least income.

So what should the authorities do about the move from boom to bust in the mortgage market? They should not rush to regulate to dictate terms to mortgage companies., Saying now people cannot in future borrow 125% of the value of their property, or saying to those without deposits they have to save for one first would be seeking to bolt the stable door long after the horse has gone. Yesterday’s problem was too much borrowing. Today’s may easily become too little if the government is not careful.

The Bank should cut interest rates, to offset some of the unplanned increase in rates we have seen in recent weeks. It needs to try to get control back over the general level of rates in the markets. The authorities should not introduce new and more mortgage regulation. In a global market it is difficult for such regulation to bite if done nationally, whilst the consequences will be harmful to those seeking UK based loans, making them still scarcer and dearer.

It is probably necessary to cut Northern Rock’s mortgage book because the bank is now nationalised and must not be seen to competing successfully to lend more money. It is certainly necessary to get the taxpayers money back in reasonable time. This will place a continuing strain on the mortgage market, as other lenders find the £50 billion to replace the Northern mortgages destined to be repaid. In these conditions the Bank needs to do all it can to keep the mortgage market reasonably liquid, without putting more taxpayers money at risk without more than adequate collateral and protection. The Bank should also be sympathetic to the idea that the banking sector should not have to write down all their good quality shorter term paper every time some financial institution has to dump some of it at distressed prices to raise cash, for that way leads to a race to the bottom with continuing dangers for some financial institutions.

It is important amidst all the puritan commentary telling us it serves people right, that they have borrowed too much and the financial sector has been greedy and irresponsible, to remember that people still need homes and home ownership is the best way of organising and financing that. The important task is to get rid of the froth in the market without causing a slump, for that would just put more people into misery and prevent the rising generation buying a home as soon as they would like.

The taxpayers’ misery – and the government’s discomfort – have now begun. The nationalisation of Northern Rock will be costly to taxpayers and damaging to the government’s reputation.

Last night the government brushed aside Conservative proposals to handle Northern Rock in a different way and to avoid the taxpayer taking on responsibility for all the jobs, mortgages, loans, properties and bills.

Instead, the government announced a one third cut in the workforce, and a halving in the size of the business, along with confirmation that the bank will lose money in each of the next three years. That prospectus for the nationalised business suited no-one. MPs from the North East, along with the rest of us, did not want to see such large reductions in the workforce. MPs who care about the taxpayer do not wish to see taxpayers having to foot the bill for the job losses and the other losses in the business.

The government refused to tell us what the forecast losses amount to, implying they will be significant. They refused to tell us how the taxpayer would be asked to pay for these losses, implying they have not thought through how the revenue subsidy will be injected in to the business. Their numbers of course did not add up, as the size of the business is going to be reduced by more than the workforce, implying further job losses to come later.

The Chief Secretary contented herself with claiming that the Opposition had no alternative to nationalisation, declining to answer my points about how the Bank of England and the Treasury could have acted as Northern’s bank manager, lending them the minimum necessary to see them through and managing the repayment of the loan in a timely way.

The government seems to be in denial. It thinks nationalisation is the answer, when it will turn out to be a whole new load of problems. Every staff member dismissed, every loan that goes bad, every customer upset now stretches up to a Minister who is in ultimate control of the destiny of the company. They do not seem to have a plan to handle the complex management problems, and are refusing to own up to the magnitude of the cash requirements of their new acquisition.

Last night the Opposition were right to ask them to think again. We were right to offer them a better way of handling a distressed bank. It is a pity for all of us they turned us down and made silly political points instead.

It is good news that the Bank of England is thinking about its role in modern markets, and that the US and UK authorities are to review how to handle banking liquidity and regulation in future.

This agenda should include:

1. Have the Basel regulatory arrangements encouraged too much off balance sheet lending?

2. How can a market in securitised good quality loans be restored? Should the authorities buy in or accept as collateral more of these loans, whilst protecting taxpayers against losses?

3. Has the UK Government burdened British markets with too much off balance sheet borrowing of its own? Can this be curbed?

4. Do the leading Central Banks have enough capital of their own to keep markets liquid enough?

5. Shouldn’t Central Banks try to keep market interest rates in line with their announced main interest rate by open market operations?

There is nothing wrong with the idea of banks bundling up loans and selling them to others in the market. That is healthy and helps the growth of the world economy. The danger arises if the banks themselves continue owning large quantities of corporate bonds or securitised papers in conditions where they find they cannot sell or value these assets at a realistic price. Market seizure for bonds or loan packages forces banks to cut their lending and to write down the value of these assets on their balance sheets in moves which can become a vicious circle.

The Central Banks need to find a way of keeping the high quality bond and securitised paper market in line with their chosen interest rate generally. That should be the main issue facing the US/UK Committee.

Meanwhile, the UK Government needs to ensure rapid and orderly repayment of the Northern Rock loans and needs to consider whether that is sufficient to give the Bank of England the financial firepower it needs. It also needs to cut its own appetite for borrowing, which is now in danger of crowding out other borrowers from the market. The Bank needs some of its old powers – and information – back from the FSA so it can understand banks’ positions more quickly and respond in money markets appropriately.

I am glad to see the Telegraph today giving front page prominence to the rise in mortgage rates this week. See yesterday’s blog on interest rates and the MPC for the background.