Author: johnredwood

If more evidence is needed by the Bank of England and by some the bloggers to this site that things are slowing down rapidly, it has come tonight in figures showing mortgage approvals down by more than a third and house prices falling, on top of the evidence of larger falls in commercial property.

The Bank of England has let it be known it will make more money available to the money markets ahead of the year ends for the leading banks. That is welcome – better late than never. The Bank should also realise that conditions remain very tight, and interest rates remain too high for the conditions. Every bank is going to want to show a strong balance sheet with good liquidity over the year end, so there will be a scramble for cash and for smaller stronger balance sheets. That is not the background to higher inflation!

Why does Mr Cable want to wreck any proposal to solve the Northern Rock crisis? Today he sought to belittle the Branson bid, telling people it was unlikely to go ahead. I won’t repeat what he said about the risks to the taxpayer as the statement was unacceptable. He also accused sharebuyers of being “spivs and sharks” and said he wanted to stop any shareholder, big or small being able to sell shares any more by suspending them in the market!

Mr Cable’s shrill interventions are not going to win the Lib Dems any friends amongst the business community, and will put off anyone who cares about the small shareholders, depositors and taxpayers caught up in the Northern Rock crisis. If Leader Clegg (or Huhne if there is a late swing) has any sense he will terminate Cable’s role as Treasury spokesman before he is allowed to do much more damage.

Today we hear Richard Branson has become the preferred bidder for Northern Rock. It is good news that there is some movement, and there could be an outcome which keeps some of the Northern Rock staff trading with a new owner and looking after the customers and loans.

The scheme outlined on the radio implies the Bank of England and the Treasury did not take proper security for all the loans they advanced. It is high time Mr Darling explained the true position about this, and if they failed to take sufficient security for all the lending to explain why they made such an extraordinary decision.

According to the briefings so far, the taxpayer will get around half the money back immediately, and the other half back over a 2-3 year period. In the meantime the taxpayer will get similar security to other creditors. Presumably it also means no more government lending to Northern Rock, compared to the current position where the taxpayer is on the hook to lend more all the time there are deposit withdrawals. That would be a welcome development.

That may be a good outcome. To be able to judge it, the taxpayers’ representatives need to know how bad our starting position is. What, if anything, has been promised on repayment dates for the current loans? How many of them are secured on specific assets, which is better than a floating charge assuming they are secured on good assets in sufficient quantities? I have asked all these questions, but the taxpayer is still in the dark about how much money has been committed and on what basis.

Mr. Darling has made it impossible for the market to value the shares, as the market does not know the basics about how much money for how long is available to the company. If he is to persaude us all that he now will do a good deal for the taxpayer and for the UK fianncial system – his two legitimate aims – he needs to tell us more about the current position. The BBC this morning themselves asserted that there is a false market in the shares. The reason must be the lack of government transparency. That is unacceptable, after the Chancellor’s lecture to bankers that they needed to be more transparent!

I do hope Mr cable is getting ready with his apology for his irresponsible behaviour, if there is a successful rescue bid for Northern Rock. He has been so keen to attack Northern Rock and all involved with the company, making a rescue that more difficult.

Over the last decade I have made many speeches trying to point out that Gordon Brown did not make the Bank of England independent, and did weaken the Bank’s ability to respond to financial crises. I reminded any audience willing to listen that in 1997 he took away the Bank’s power to regulate individual banks, and removed its role of running the public debt. He did not even make the MPC completely independent in the way advertised.

These two changes greatly weakened the Bank’s ability to understand and control the money markets. When the mortgage bank crisis hit the Bank of England did not itself monitor the daily cash and credit positions of the banks, and did not itself organise the daily intervention of the government in the market with its own debt instruments.The need to respond to a banking problem in negotiation with the FSA and the Chancellor was bound to slow things down and make it difficult to come to a timely and sensible answer.

I reflected this in the more meaured prose of the Opposition’s Economic Policy Review (Freeing Britain to compete – available as a download on this site). In that we wrote:

“We are concerned about the division of responsibility between the FSA and the Bank over banking and market regulation. Fortunately conditions in the last decade have been benign internaitonally, with no threats to banking liquidity. We think it would be safer if the Bank of England had responsibility for solvency regulation of UK-based banks, as well as having the overall duty to keep the system solvent. Otherwise there could be dangerous delays if a banking crisis did hit,with information having to be exchanged between the two regulators; and there might be gaps in each regulator’s view of the banking sector at a crucial time, when early regulatory action might have spared a worse problem.”

If we could see that from Opposition, why was the government unable to do so?

Typical of the BBC to protect Gordon Brown and Alastair Darling by inserting the word “international” in front of “credit squeeze” when correctly reporting this morning that the credit squeeeze is now hitting the “real economy”.

Do you remember all those pompous commentaries from “experts” when the credit crunch first hit, assuring us this was just a problem for all those overpaid financiers and bankers in the City? Many took a dellight in the llikelihood of the well paid financial sector being brought to earth with a bump. This site said at the time this was a serious credit crunch which would have an impact on all our daily lives and on many businesses. So it is proving.

It is also a credit crunch made in Downing Street and Threadneedle Street. There is no home made credit crunch in much of Asia, and in the USA they are already moving to relax their credit crunch. Only in the UK this summer did the Central Bank resolutely tell bankers to sort themselves out, refusing to supply liquidity to markets and refusing to cut interest rates. I warned at the time they were being too tough.

Our accident prone Chancellor made a speech explaining that banks had made too many dodgy loans and needed to tighten up their lending. He warned banks there would be no bail if they did this, just days before he announced a gurantee for all bank deposits for any institution in trouble! We will now count the damage in falling property prices, cancelled investment projects, shortage of mortgages and loans and fewer jobs.

Mr Cable is being praised by the BBC for his “success” as acting Lib dem Leader. This “success” is to pursue a nasty campaign against the shareholders and management of Northern Rock, in an attempt to politicise a difficult situation and force a nationalisation of the bank. Mr Cable seems to want to wipe out the value of Northern Rock shares, being no friend of either the small or large shareholders of the bank. Rightly asking how the government secures and retrieves the taxpayers’ ??25 billion, he then makes a fool of himself by suggesting taxpayers take on all ??100 billion of the liabilities instead!

I have a few questions for the garrulous Mr Cable:

1. If he is worried about security for the ??25 billion, why does he think taxpayers securing all the ??100 billion of total liabilities which the state would take over if it nationalised the bank would improve the taxpayers’ position?

2. What could the government as owner of the bank, that it cannot do as bank manager to the bank?

3. How much skill would this government show at running a mortgage bank? What skills do they have that the market lacks?

4. Why does he wish to bail out all the creditors of Northern Rock by guaranteeing their position through nationalisation?

5. How would he pay for the nationalisation? I appreciate he thinks he should take over the shares for nothing, but the whole ??100 billion of assets need financing, and all of that borrowing would then fall to the taxpayers’ account.

Mr Cable has shown little understanding of the complexities of a mortgage bank, and no statesmanship. Some of us commenting and asking questions have been very careful not to say or do anything which could make the position worse. When I was warning of the dangers of the UK credit crunch before the run on Northern Rock began I made sure I did not repeat market rumours about Northern and other institutions by name. Mr Cable seems to revel in trying to make things worse. The BBC fails to ask Cable the difficult quesitons about his wish to condemn all involved with Northern Rock, and fails to expose the folly of his nationalisation scheme. Nationalisation would be expensive at a time when the government is already over borrowed and over committed; would delay tackling the real problem of refinancing the Rock in the private sector; and could lead to shareholder actions against the government for failing to recognise the potential value of the Rock’s assets.

If it’s Calamity Clegg, it’s also Calamity Cable.

Mr Cable cannot go on the media without saying something nasty about Northern Rock. Today he was accusing a leading shareholder of “blackmail”, when all the shareholder was doing was poiting out that this is a regulated solvent company according to the FSA and the Bank of England, still trading and with a valuable mortgage portfolio. Mr Cable should stop attacking it, and understand that there are ways to protect the mortgages, the deposits and the taxpayer loans without nationalisation. Any sensible person who cares about the living standards of people in the UK should want a successful outcome to the rescue, and would understand that attacking the current shareholders who still decide the future of this bank is counterproductive.

I am glad there are bids on the table that may offer a way forward. There is also the option of running the bank to ensure the taxpayer is repaid, following agreement on the timing of repayments, without a takeover. I still think the government should set out in public how much money it will advance for how long, so every bidder bids on the same basis, and so the taxpayer can see how his or her interest is going to be protected. The taxpayer also needs reassurance that the government/Bank have taken sufficient security over Northern Rock’s assets to protect the position. If they haven’t so far, they should do so now and publish how much collateral they have for the loans.

The absence of public information over how much the taxpayer has committed. Parliament should be told about this large sum. Those assessing the bids should also want to know that all bidders had bid on the same basis concerning the available public support, and should want confirmation that there are no misunderstandinbgs about how much money is on offer for how long. You cannot value Northern Rock shares today, as Mr Richards the shareholder said on the radio, unless you know how much public money is on offer on what terms.

I asked the Leader of the House today the simple question:

When will the government seek Parliamentary approval for the ??25 billion they have spent so far on Northern Rock, and the ??25 billion they have guaranteed and where did the Treasury and the Bank find the ??25 billion?

This should not be a difficult questions to answer. The Leader of the House is meant to know Parliamentary procedure. Every item opf public spending has to be approved by the House under a vote for an estimate. There was no estimate for Northern Rock when Parliament approved this year’s budget. Clearly the government is either going to have to put through a supplementary estimate for the money, or to seek to argue that it does not have to bother, on the spurious grounds that it hopes to get the spending back.

Clearly also, as the govrnment is already borrowing heavily this year, the money for Northern Rock was either borrowed or came from selling other Bank of England assets.I suspect it was mixture of the two. I suspect there is also a Treasury guarantee to the Bank of England.

It is high time Ministers worked out how they are going to report and control this massive spending, to look as if they know what they are doing. Miss Harman told us that the ledning to Northern Rock was made available, amongst other reasons, to ensure shareholders did not lose money. Has she looked at the share price recently? Wouild she like to apologise for getting that wrong?

On Monday we heard from the Chancellor about Northern Rock. He gave us no figures, but it appears they have already lent ??25 billion of our money to the mortgage bank, and have guaranteed maybe a further ??25 billion. This money is either borrowed, or will have to be borrowed if the guarantees trigger.

Later that day the hapless Chief Secretary to the Treasury came to push through a Bill to give away part of the UK’s rebate on EU contributions – one of Tony Blair’s EU poison pills for Gordon on takeover.

As we have come to expect, the very short Explanatory Memorandum supplied with the even shorter Bill cotained at least three errors, along with an errata sheet. Once again a Labour Minister had failed to supervise papers coming to the House properly.

Andy Burnham wanted to disguise the extent of the giveaway, but had to admit that the gross cost of the EU to the UK over the next seven years, after allowing for the remaining rebate, will be a massive ??70 billion. He and Kitty Ussher, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, seemed to be find it difficult to grasp that it is the gross amount of our contribution (after rebate) that taxpayers have to pay. The fact that some of the money is subsequently spent in the UK does not mean that money is “free”. It either has to be borrowed and repaid with interest by taxpayers, or paid for from higher taxes in the first place.

So on the same day we saw the governemnt announce ??95 billion of extra borrowing – and more possible for Northern Rock – on just two spending items, the EU and a mortgage bank. They will argue that the EU money is already in their spending figures, but it is a sobering thought that they want to commit ??95 billion of money they do not have to these two causes. If we borrow the ??95 billion at 5% for 20 years that means UK taxpayers will pay ??180 billion, assuming we do not have to borrow the interest payments as well! Let’s hope if they get the money back from Northern Rock they use it to repay some debt.

How dare Mr Darling complain that the odd Conservative tax cut would create a “black hole” when he has two such massive black holes in his own figures.

(If you are interested in the EU contribution debate see the link to my speech in the debate )

Yesterday was a dispiriting sight in the Commons. We saw Lib Dems and Labour arguing over the future of a bank when none of them seemed to understand the first thing about how banking operates. Nor did they seem to understand the complicated banking regulations and company law they have put in place over the last decade.

Cable for the Lib Dems set the terms of the debate in an entirely false way, which unfortunately some in the media have copied. He offered two “solutions” as the only possible options – put NR into administration (i.e. bankrupt it) or nationalise it.

Neither of these courses of action make any sense and should be rejected at this stage.

Of course the government could bankrupt the Rock, if it withdrew its funding and the promise of more cash and if no private sector party stepped in with the offer of the money. That would renege on government promises and might break its loan agreement (we still have not seen what form that takes or what period it covers). It would still require the government to bail out the depositors, unless they reneged on that promise as well. It might prove to be dearer than other options, and would probably lead to law suits against the government by shareholder and other interests who could legitimately complain about the inconsistency of government actions.

The government could push a nationalisaiton bill through the Commons with Lib dem support. Presumably that would offer no compensation to the shareholders. Then the taxpayer would be on risk not just for ??24-25billion of loans and the estimated ??16 billion of remaining deposit guarantees, but for the whole ??100 billion of liabilities on the 2006 balance sheet and any additional ones added since the last year end. The government would then have to make the announcements about sacking the staff that were superfluous to the slimmed down business they would be running, would have to pay all the bills whether the company werre profitable or not, and stand behind all the obligaitons of the company. The government would need to repay the debts outstanding to other city institutions as they fell due. Why would that be good for the taxpayer? What does Alastair Darling know about running a mortgage bank that he cannot share with the external management already in place?

The only sensible course of action from here is to ignore siren pleas for liquidation or nationalisation, and to manage the debt and the deposits rationally like a proper bank manager. The government has not “nationalised” the bank by lending it money. What it needs to do, if it hasn’t already is:

1. Secure sufficient asset cover to guraantee repayment of all its lending to NR whatever happens. If it does not have enough asset cover – and in current conditions you need to take much more than100% cover given the possibiltiy that the value of mortgages will fall – it should do so as a condition for future lending.

2. Set out the repayment schedule it expects, preferably in agreement with NR but if necessary it has to impose one.

3. The shareholders and Directors of NR then have a choice – a) trade their way out of it b) find a bidder for the whole who will meet the repayment schedule or c) start selling the assets off piecemeal to meet the repayment schedule. They and the Regulators tell us they are solvent. That means that the assets cover the liabilities, so selling the assets will enable them to repay the liabilities. The government only wants one quarter of the assets of the business to repay it loans so far, so it should be achievable.

4. The deposit guarantee should continue but the governemnt should replace it as soon as possible by the beefed up general deposit insurance scheme they are working on with the City. If the deposit guarantees trigger the need for more funding the Bank of England should allow for that within its schedule of repayments.

The Directors and shareholders should be given a chance to rescue it by methods a) or b). The timetable should ensure that if they do not do so in reasonable time then method c), an orderly run off, kicks in automatically. That way taxpayers can get our money back without legal actions against the government for precipitating a crisis.

Mr Darling failed to tell us what markets and Parliament needed to know yesterday – how much money has been lent on what terms. The absence of this information runs the danger of creating a false market in the shares. It also means the task of evaluating bids for NR is difficult if not impossible . If bidders do not know how much money is available on what terms, how can they ascribe a sensible value to the company? And how can you compare bids, if bidders have made different assumptions about government generosity?