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There are three main reason any the UK would be better off out of the current EU and its all embracing Treaty commitments.  The first is we would free to govern ourselves. The second is we would be better off financially. The third is the UK would have more influence in the wider world and would not be dragged into EU conflicts.

Today let us begin the case by looking at the question of self government. I find in replying to constituents that they are often surprised to be told that something cannot be done here in the UK, or requires a change of European law.  Successive governments have not stressed to electors just how much power has been given away in various treaties. Labour chose to understate and to deny transfers of powers when signing us up to the Nice Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties. Mr Major was able to stress that the UK opted out of the main point of the Maastricht Treaty , but it too was part of a long journey to ever closer union.

Equally important has been the continuous flood of new Directives, regulations and court decisions coming from Brussels. The UK under a qualified majority voting system has often been persuaded to go along with unsatisfactory texts on the basis that an alternative would be worse. All too infrequently in recent years has the UK been able to resist a new EU law. Each Directive or regulation means another area which is no longer under the control of the UK Parliament and people. It is rare to persuade the EU to repeal or amend anything, unless to replace it with an even more far reaching proposal.

Under the original Treaty of Rome the UK surrendered its farming  policy and fishing grounds to EU control. Since then the EU has come to take over most financial regulation, employment law, health and safety law, competition law, environmental policy, energy policy, general business regulation, VAT and some aspects of Corporation tax, whilst also introducing collaboration on common European networks, foreign policy, Home affairs and borders. Welfare and general taxation, two areas we were always told were outside EU competence, have also been made subject to constraints or interventions by the EU and the European courts.

UK voters believe they live in a  country where public opinion can influence and change a government’s mind and the law, or can lead to a change of government to one who will. This is no longer true in all too many areas of life and law. The polls now show some realisation of this truth, with most people in the UK wanting power back from the EU, even if they still wish to remain a member. The Labour government made a big mistake in not being honest with UK voters about the magnitude of the power sacrificed under Nice, Amsterdam and Lisbon, and the large number of directives and regulations they approved. Each time we were told it was a tidying up exercise, or a modest proposal. In total it was a major slice of our power of self government needlessly given away.

Whilst the UK has held an official referendum and given people in Scotland the chance to vote for independence, the people of Catalunya have been given no such freedom by the Spanish state. The EU seems to be on the side of Spain, reluctant to see a rupture in one of the larger member states. This approach has helped fuel Catalan nationalism.

The forthcoming elections will allow the people of Catalunya the opportunity to make their views known again. The four main parties in favour of independence have come together as Catalyuna Si. If they can stay together with a common platform for the election, polls suggest they can do very well. The Spanish state will have to face the fact that a large and rich region within Spain is serious about leaving and being independent.

In the past there have been unofficial referendums pointing to strong support for independence, and election results that have boosted the independence cause. None of this has mattered, with the  Spanish state using legal Union means to thwart the popular will. The impact of the Euro and EU economic policy on Spain’s economy is clearly not helping those who want to keep Spain together, as it has depressed overall Spanish employment and income levels and left many in enterprising Calalunya thinking they would be better off outside the Spanish kingdom.

Why is the EU so hostile to democracy? Why can’t the Catalans have a referendum like Scotland? What will the EU and the Spanish government do if the Catalan parties win most of the seats and a majority of the vote in Catalonia?

In a recent article the past German Foreign Minister, Joshka Fischer, argues that on the night of July 12-13 2015 Germany made a momentous decision during the talks on Greece. Under the influence of her Finance Minister, the German Chancellor shifted from wanting more Europe, a European Germany, to wanting less Europe and a German led Europe.

I agree with Mr Fischer that Germany argued strongly for a Euro in Germany’s own image. He went on to explain how the economic policy put onto Greece will not work and how Germany now wants the Euro as a sphere of influence rather than as a European project. I do not agree with him that this means less Europe, as he puts it. It means more Europe of the kind Germany seeks. It will mean more budgetary controls over other member states, more common economic policies. States other than Greece will become in Mr Fischer’s words “European protectorates” following German led policy.

Germany’s main interest now seems to be to avoid making the transfers and payments that rich parts of a currency zone have to make to allow it to work. That is why Germany recommends more austerity for a country like Greece, in preference to sending Greece grants to assist her in a time of need. The policy is not working so far, as Germany has been party to large loans with strict terms that now may not be repaid, or will be repaid with less interest over a longer time period, making them more like the grants Germany opposes.

The latest disaster is the impact of the EU generated banking crisis in Greece on economic output and tax revenue. The longer the Euro members took to argue over the next bail out, and the meaner the ECB was in making money available to the Greek banking system, the more damage was done to the incomes and budgets of Greek people and the Greek state. There is a danger that the damage done to the Greek accounts mean that the third bail out package still being negotiated will not be enough.

That will just confirm the German view that they need to be tougher in requiring financial discipline and economic reform from the rest of the Eurozone. Mr Fischer is right to tell us we now have a German led Europe. In view of the stresses and strain, and the need for more discipline and centralised policy for the Euro area, the case for UK exit from the EU or that fundamental change of relationship becomes clearer by the day.

The current chaos in Calais is no advert for common borders and EU involvement in migration policy. The introduction of the Schengen system of no borders between most EU countries has to be coupled with a strong border wherever a  Schengen EU country shares a frontier or faces across the sea  to a non  EU nation. France has found out that her border with Italy allows many illegal migrants to come from Italy, because the original Italian frontier was not strongly policed. The EU shows no ability to settle fair and acceptable rules over legal admissions, nor any great ability to police its borders through its various member states governments.

The UK is half in and half out of the EU system. Not in Schengen, the UK can police its border to some extent. Under EU rules however, it is not free to make all the decisions it might like on benefits, treatment of migrants on arrival, and rejection of claims to asylum or residence. Many of these matters for the UK are influenced or affected by EU and ECHR law. The Schengen borderless area was agreed between some EU states in 1985, and incorporated into the EU Treaties at Amsterdam in 1999.Labour did opt us out of most of that, but opted us into the police and judicial co-operation arrangements and the Schengen Information System. Conservatives opposed Schengen and Amsterdam at the time.

The UK is currently seeking the co-operation of the French authorities to improve security at the UK’s frontier in Calais. Their willingness to improve security is important to us, and it is right that the UK supplies support to the task of improving security. However, we want a longer term and more satisfactory solution than each night police having to resist attacks upon the fences, trains and lorries by people desperate to reach the UK by illegal means. That requires changes to UK and EU policy.

France may like to revisit Schengen with her partners and see if she can reduce the numbers entering France from Italy, Spain and other EU neighbours. That is not something the UK will have much influence over. There are few signs that the common migration policy works or is about the be reformed sensibly.

The UK is seeking to toughen its stance, to send a message to would be illegal migrants that getting to the UK is not a good idea for them. The UK  announced under the Coalition  that illegals will not have access to housing, bank accounts, driving licences, benefits and the rest. The new government is now seeking to put in place detailed legislation and administration to make sure that happens.

Yesterday came the news that landlords will be expected to evict illegal migrants when they  are told by the Home Office that their asylum claim has failed. I have no problem with criminal sanctions being taken against the small minority of landlords who  allow all too many illegal migrants to rent space in  overcrowded properties for high  rents for the whole house, knowing their tenants will keep quiet about conditions because they are not legally settled here. I trust decent landlords will not end up in prison because they have made a mistake about an individual’s residence status, or have been misled by false or misleading documents.

The BBC Today and World at One programmes did some good interviews of Ministers on this topic. They stressed that surely the prime duty to sort this out should rest with the Home Office. The issue is why doesn’t the Home Office move quickly to ask people to leave and help them leave the country as soon as their case is settled? The government points out that it does do this in a number of cases.  The choice surely is a simple one. If someone is illegal that means they should leave the country. If they are granted asylum or residence for other reasons they should be properly supported. We wish to avoid a third category of people who are not legally entitled to be here, yet who qualify for inadequate support, finding it difficult to do much by legal means owing to the tougher rules.

Meanwhile this tragedy is argument enough for the UK to regain control over her own borders, welfare and housing policies.

In July 2012 Mr Clegg tried to go  ahead with a wide ranging proposed reform of the Lords without sufficient support in either the Commons or the Lords. His proposal for a mixed House of elected and unelected peers did not proceed.

At the time I argued for a range of lesser reforms to the current Lords which others were also interested in. I explained why I thought his proposals were both flawed and unable to gain  the consent of both houses of Parliament.  I favoured a time limit on a Lords appointment or a high upper age limit on membership of the Lords. I proposed a use it or lose it rule, so non attenders would lose the right to debate and vote, as Councillors do who fail to turn up. David Steel also worked up a reform agenda which sought to tackle some of the anomalies in tenure.

Since then the Lords has made some progress. It has introduced a voluntary retirement scheme so those who no longer have the energy and appetite to contribute can retire. It has introduced a procedure to allow the expulsion of a peer for bad conduct.

Today Lords reform is back on the agenda, both because of the recent misbehaviour of a former Labour peer, and because the Conservatives want to create more peers to deal modestly with the large voting imbalance for the government in the current Lords.

Any suggestion of more peers produces criticisms as there are already so many. It looks as if it is time to introduce some limit on the length of tenure of a newly selected peer, and to engage with current peers to see if more can be persuaded to retire.

What changes would you like to see? Those who favour radical change need to remember that this Conservative government made no proposals in its manifesto, has a small majority in the Commons, and a large deficit of votes in the Lords. Lords reform requires the consent of the Lords, unless perhaps some future government has made a big issue of a scheme of Lords reform in the country in a manifesto, won an election and has public opinion behind it in wanting to legislate for a new Lords or no Lords against the wishes of existing peers. Using the Parliament Act to do so would still be a large constitutional argument.

There are some in the media who treat the Labour leadership campaign as some strange alternative story from the main drama of government and people. They did the same to the Conservatives during much of our period in opposition.

Who is Leader of the Opposition always matters. The Country will need a choice at the next election, and when  the election draws nearer the Leader of the main challenger party naturally gets more attention and becomes more interesting.

The Leader of the Opposition with the Shadow Cabinet also determines some of the business of the Commons through Opposition day debates, and can always set the main political conversation point through having 6 questions each week at Prime Minister’s Questions, which in turn feeds the media.

The next Leader of the Opposition has an additional  relevance  as well as being a future possible PM whose importance  only rises if he or she gets the Labour Party high enough in the polls to be a possible winner. As soon as the new Leader is elected he or she will have to decide whether our country bombs Syria or not. The PM has no majority to do it if Labour opposes the government, but is likely to do it and can do it if Labour is on a three line whip to abstain or to support the bombing.

Then there is the pressing  question of what does Labour want by way of change in our EU relationship? Again the Leader’s view will have an immediate influence  on what the government asks for and recommends. The decision of Labour to support or  oppose continued membership will have influence on a crucial referendum.

There is the question of welfare reform. Whilst the government can probably get its way on what it wants despite a small majority, the task is much easier if Labour abstain or support the main thrust of the proposals to make it more worthwhile for people to work.

Mr Corbyn as Leader would presumably vote against military intervention in Syria. He seems to have diluted his sceptical views about current EU policy and may now wish to support continued membership whatever the outcome of the negotiations. If so it means all 4 Labour leadership contenders will be passive on the EU issue, declining to demand sensible improvements and indicating before the negotiations are settled that they will vote to stay in. In so doing they make a successful negotiation less likely and continue their long tradition of denying the significance of EU matters. Mr Corbyn will doubtless oppose most welfare reforms, and will seek to drag the political debate to the left.

Our democracy needs a strong and sensible Leader of the Opposition. Labour still is out to lunch on the main issue of our day, our relationship to the emerging political union on the continent.

The major currencies of the world are backed by single states. These states usually arrange a banking union, a benefits or transfer union and a common economic policy as well as a monetary union. Behind every good currency lies a unified nation of taxpayers who accept the legitimacy of their government and Central Bank.

Currency unions break up when these conditions cease to exist. The collapse of the rouble bloc followed quickly after the dissolution of the forced political union of the USSR. The countries which emerged from the Soviet empire wanted to control their own money. The Republic of Ireland kept the pound when it first separated from the UK, but later adopted its own currency to complete its independence. The Scandinavian and latin currency unions broke up in disagreements over the debts around one hundred years ago.

We have recently seen two interesting cases of the political arguments which can emerge in a currency union when people within it start to question the political union that goes with the currency. In the case of Scotland I think it was the wish of a majority of Scottish people to keep the pound that led them to vote to stay in the political union called the UK. They saw that all the Union parties rightly agreed that if Scotland left the political union the currency union would also be broken up, as it would be unsustainable. Why would taxpayers from the rest of the UK wish to shore up Scottish banks if we were no longer part of the same country? What would happen if Scotland followed economic and tax policies which were incompatible with the policies of the rest of the UK within the currency union? How would Scotland manage if oil revenues collapsed but no longer received compensatory payments from other UK taxes and taxpayers?

In the debates over Scottish devolution I raised the issue of how far can you go in unpicking the benefits, tax and transfer union before there are problems for the currency area? Parliament is going to have to return to the issue of the money before the new devolution settlement is completed. Under present rules there are common rates of benefits, and a sharing of the risks of paying for those benefits throughout the single currency area by all taxpayers in the UK.

As Scotland presses to see how far you can go in dismantling a political union which backs a currency union, Greece is testing how far a country has to go in accepting a political union in order to justify a currency union. Today there is a strong enough political union with revenue and expense sharing in the UK for the pound to work for Scotland and all other parts of the sterling area, but there is insufficient political union with revenue and expense sharing in the Euro area for the Euro to work for Greece. Greece has lived in almost perpetual recession for eight years, with a loss of one quarter of its income and output, partly because there are no proper mechanisms to share revenue and risk within the Eurozone. The Euro needs much more political union to even out the gross imbalances between the rich north and the rest.

Several of you want to write and talk about Calais. Here is your chance.

I want the UK to gain control of its own borders through renegotiation or leaving the EU, as I have made clear on many occasions.

In the meantime I want us to use all legal means to ensure economic migrants do not cross the channel illegally. I am glad the government has said it intends to strengthen our frontiers in Calais and stated any illegal migrants who do get through will not have access to cars, homes or bank accounts if they do come. Illegal migrants need to see that coming without permission does not work for them. The rest of the EU needs to improve its border control. France needs to work with Italy and Greece on their borders and access of illegal migrants to France from southern ports.

Clearly anyone arriving in Dover from Calais cannot be an asylum seeker as France is a democratic country with proper human rights, so anyone wishing to claim asylum should be returned to France.

What measures do you propose?

I will be writing to Mrs May about this and will post what I say to her. The UK government must ensure that only people with legal travel documents that entitle them to come to the UK come here or are allowed to stay here, unless they are genuine asylum seekers arriving directly from a country where they may be at risk of their lives.

If you look at the EU figures for incomes and output per head the dominance of a few large cities comes across from the statistics. in the 2013 figures Inner London is by far the richest region within the EU. It records an average income per head of 80,000 Euros,more than twice as high as any other part of the UK and more than twice as high as most other EU regions. The dominance of Paris in French economic success is also clear. The Ile de France area , Greater Paris, enjoyed an income of 44,200 Euros a head. The next richest region in France was Rhone Alps at Euro 26,400. These two largest cities in the EU are the most successful in generating high value added services and output, and sustaining more better paid jobs than elsewhere.

Most other European cities are of modest size by modern world standards,and do not establish the same lead over incomes elsewhere in their countries. Berlin is relatively poor. Hamburg is Germany’s top performer with a high income level. In Austria Vienna is the highest earning area by a decent margin, and in Belgium Antwerp is the leader. Outer London is relatively weak, with an average income considerably below the Home Counties that lie beyond it. In the UK Bristol is the one other city aside from Inner London that delivers a higher average income than most parts of the country. Were the EU figures to combine Inner and Outer London it would look more like Paris/Ile de France.

The figures show that cities do seem to offer the best prospects of concentrating, nurturing and using talent to boost incomes and jobs. It is not a universal panacea, as some cities enter periods of decline, stuck with older industries and patterns of working that no longer command high wages. They may also lose talent as it migrates elsewhere, and have a higher ratio of people dependent on state assistance. Fast growing cities on the other hand suck in more talent and may have younger average ages and higher proportions in work.

Other forces can provide high incomes. NE Scotland has done well out of oil, providing enough well paid jobs in that industry to make it one of the best paid regions on average. In the UK Cornwall and West Wales are the lowest income areas, with Lincolnshire, East and South Yorkshire and Merseyside also towards the bottom of the table. The Northern Powerhouse can help boost the great northern cities. As the figures show the lowest incomes in the UK are in rural areas.

In much of the EU the regions that wish to be independent are the richer parts of their present countries. In Spain Catalonia is the most enterprising and highest income part of Spain along with the Basque country which is also keen on having more self government and control of its own tax revenues. In Italy the main force for independence comes from the Northern League where average incomes are much higher than in the south and where economic performance has been much better than in the rest of the country. Venice is a particularly successful city state with a strong wish to be independent. In Belgium the richer north is keenest to split away. In Germany there is less force for self government thanks to the relative success of federal economic policy despite the lander system of devolved government, but even there it is rich Bavaria which seems the most semi detached. In the UK it is different. The richest part of the country is London but there is no serious move to create a City state independent of the UK, whereas some parts of the Union that require substantial transfer payments with lower average incomes have a strong sense of individual identity. Scotland’s wealth and income is a matter of dispute depending on how you account for and project oil revenues.

Language is often a force for separation. The Catalan and Walloon speakers of Spain and Belgium see their language as part of their difference from the rest of their current country. The EU has fostered the development and revival of local languages which has reinforced these feelings. The EU seemed to want to use local and regional identity as a force to weaken the power of unitary states like Spain and Italy. It appealed over the heads of the member states to these regions. It had in mind not a host of smaller new countries claiming independence, but a subsidy or dependency union for the regions. It looked forward to regional allies and gratitude for the money sent to the regions, money it only had thanks to the contributions of the member states.

Now the EU is so much more powerful it has new problems to resolve. Will it seek to play down the demands for independence generally, as it is clearly doing in Catalonia? And now it has ambitions for a common foreign policy, how will it respond to similar tensions in non EU countries? Is it pleased with its work in Ukraine, where it wants the Russian minority to accept the pro EU policy of the western majority? In the Middle East is it feasible to ally with the Kurds against ISIL but to deny them their aim of a Kurdish state? Does the EU seek a federal solution to the governance problems of Iraq and Syria?

Outside the EU the politics of identity can become violent and extreme. It is most important the EU treads carefully if at all over these intricate and deep seated issues within Europe as we wish to keep the peace.