John Redwood's Diary
Incisive and topical campaigns and commentary on today's issues and tomorrow's problems. Promoted by John Redwood 152 Grosvenor Road SW1V 3JL

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Written Answers from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero – carbon tax

Thus fails to reveal the impact of high carbon taxes in UK

 

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero provided the following answer to your written parliamentary question (187013):

Question:
To ask the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, what comparative estimate he has made of the costs of carbon tax and emissions trading on steel production in (a) the UK, (b) Germany and (c) China. (187013)

Tabled on: 02 June 2023

Answer:
Graham Stuart:

UK Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) industrial participants, such as those in the steel sector, receive free allocations limiting their exposure to the carbon price and mitigating the risk of carbon leakage.

Steel production in Germany is subject to the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) which operates under similar rules and with a similar market price to the UK ETS. Carbon costs are comparable, although will be impacted by the performance of individual steel installations relative to benchmarks. The EU ETS price has been operating at a premium to the UK ETS price for several months.

China’s National Emissions Trading Scheme currently only applies to the power sector and does not directly cover industrial installations such as steel.

The answer was submitted on 12 Jun 2023 at 14:45.

Written Answers from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero – car and battery investment

These are small sums by global standards but a reminder of the burden on taxpayers from trying to force the pace of consumer change.

 

Department for Business and Trade provided the following answer to your written parliamentary question (187006):

Question:
To ask the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, what the budget for subsidies to attract investment in car and battery manufacture (a) was this year and (b) will be next year. (187006)

Tabled on: 02 June 2023

Answer:
Ms Nusrat Ghani:

HM Government has allocated £257m of capital budget for supply chain and finished vehicle manufacturing for this financial year (2023/24) and £268m for the next financial year (2024/25).

In addition, through the Advanced Propulsion Centre and Faraday Battery Challenge programmes, with budgets of £127.1m this financial year (2023/24) and £77.5m next year (2024/25), the Government supports research and development into the next generation of low carbon and zero emission vehicle technologies and the design, development, manufacturing, and recycling of electric batteries.

The answer was submitted on 12 Jun 2023 at 15:11.

Written Answers from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero – carbon capture and storage costs

I do not think the government should allocate £20 bn to CCUS when competitors are not going this route and it is extra cost on UK production via tax.

 

 

Department for Energy Security and Net Zero provided the following answer to your written parliamentary question (187010):

Question:
To ask the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, how much the Government plans to spend on carbon (a) capture and (b) storage this year. (187010)

Tabled on: 02 June 2023

Answer:
Graham Stuart:

The 2021 Spending Review allocated £0.3bn to Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage (CCUS) for FY23/24. This funding supports the Government’s ambition for CCUS in four industrial clusters by 2030. On 15 March 2023 the Chancellor announced an up to £20 billion investment in the early development of CCUS and, on 30 March, the Government announced the eight HyNet and East Coast Cluster projects to proceed to negotiations for support through the relevant Business Models. Following this, the Government expects some adjustment to the timing of spend to reflect the pace of deployment.

The answer was submitted on 12 Jun 2023 at 13:48.

Comments to this site

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My Intervention in the Public Order Debate

John Redwood (Wokingham) (Conservative):
I am grateful for what my right hon. and learned Friend is seeking to do. Can she confirm that there could, indeed, be cases in which protesters stop one getting to hospital for an emergency operation or procedure, or stop a woman who is about to give birth from getting to hospital in a hurry, and that they are risking people’s lives?

Suella Braverman, Secretary of State for the Home Office:
Their tactics are dangerous. They are putting people’s lives at risk by stopping ambulances getting to emergencies and stopping people getting to hospital appointments. They are stopping people getting to work, school and funerals. The instances are infinite, and the disruption must stop.

My Interview with Talk TV

Please find below my interview with Talk Tv’s Julia Hartley Brewer where we discussed the Covid-19 Inquiry

You can find it between 40:31-49:47

 

Mortgage costs

The continuing rise in mortgage costs underlines my message that the rise in rates is mainly to do with the Bank of England. Last autumn they signalled rises to come, put up rates and started big bond sales to drive  the price of UK government bonds down. The problems with pension funds overcommitment  to bonds via LDI funds helped trigger an even sharper sell off. Mortgages went up.

This tine round the  Bank has again signalled the need for higher rates and is busy selling bonds off to keep prices down. There is not the same LDI complication yet mortgages have gone up again as have bond yields. Be in no doubt that rates are rising and bonds are falling because that is Bank of England policy. It means large losses for taxpayers on all those bonds the Bank bought up at very high prices. It also means a hit to homebuyers when they have to refinance their mortgages. It is the price the Bank is charging them for its own inability to control inflation  earlier.

All Souls lecture slides

John Redwood’s Lecture, All Souls College, Oxford (Slide 1)
‘The great western inflation should lead to changes at the Central Banks’
26 May 2023
11:00 – 12:30
All Soul College, Old Library, Oxford

Inflation, Consumer Price Index 2020-2023 (Slide 2)
The inflation rates demonstrate that whilst all countries faced dearer energy from the war in Ukraine, the 3 western countries faced inflation peaking at five times target whilst the two Asian majors kept inflation near the 2% target

Year UK Euro area US China Japan
2020 1.79% 0.29% 1.7% 2.39% (0.03%)
2021 0.85% 2.45% 1.4% 0.85% (0.2%)
2022 7.8% 8.31% 6.5% 2% 2.5%
2023 10.1% 6.9% 6% 2.9% 2.9%

Central Bank interest rates 2020-23 (Slide 3)

The Bank of Japan kept interest rates very low throughout, enforced by their policy of Yield Curve control

The Peoples Bank of China kept rates around 4% throughout, with some small cuts as the economy slowed
The other 3 took rates down to around zero, held them there, and then pushed them up sharply after inflation had risen to several times target

Year UK Euro area US China Japan
2020 0.1% 0.01% 0.36% 3.65% (0.1%)
2021 0.25% 0.01% 0.08% 3.85% (0.1%)
2022 3.5% 0.5% 1.68% 4.3% (0.1%)
2023 4.25% 3.25% 4.59% 3.65% (0.1%)

Slide 5

Japan and China kept money growth to similar levels that applied before covid lockdowns.
The 3 western Banks stimulated rapid growth in money and credit over the covid period

Quantitative easing and tightening (Slide 6)
The US, UK and Euro area undertook substantial QE 2020 to 2022. All three started Quantitative tightening 2022-23.
China undertook neither Japan continued with Quantitative easing throughout

The Chinese critique of the Fed and ECB (Slide 7)

It opposes “launching a deluge of strong stimulus policies “ that bring about asset bubbles, excessive investment or debt escalation
Aims to keep the size of its balance sheet stable to avoid inflation and to keep financial strength to be able to act as lender of last resort.
“held meetings to analyse the money and credit situation”
Has a target to grow money and credit in line with nominal GDP growth, and to keep inflation around 2%.
Shows a graph comparing the growth of the Fed and ECB balance sheets with the stability of its own

The defence of the leading western central banks (Slide 8)
– They claim they are independent of government
– They forecast inflation and target it directly based on their forecasts
– Their forecast of inflation is based on assessments of capacity utilisation, with special emphasis on levels of unemployment
– They claimed they needed to undertake QE when they hit zero on rates

Are these banks independent? (Slide 9)
– Changes at Federal reserve Board on change of President
– US twin mandate of employment and inflation
– UK Bank of England requires Chancellor to approve all bond changes, and to underwrite all QE/QT transactions
-ECB “will do whatever it takes” to ensure the survival of the Euro and the union scheme

Why did these western banks get their inflation forecasts so wrong? (Slide 10)
– They take a national rather than an international view of pressures, yet capacity includes imports
– Unemployment is not necessarily a proxy for capacity utilisation
– Judging capacity utilisation is very difficult – the shortage of one small part for a car can prevent production of many vehicles

Is Quantitative easing inflationary? (Slide 11)
– Is designed to inflate the prices of assets
– It created an asset bubble, with dearer bonds spilling over into dearer shares and property
– In due course the extra cash and higher asset values led to more spending and credit

Are there dangers in Quantitative tightening? (Slide 12)
– Silicon Valley Bank brought down by weakness in the bond market
– UK LDI funds became distressed shortly after the announcement of QT and falls in gilt market
– QT is deflationary, just as QE is inflationary

Why did 3 central banks want to lose so much money in bonds? (Slide 13)
– The central banks bought up more and more bonds at excessively high prices. They then increased interest rates, signalled the wish to see bonds lower and then started selling bonds at a loss.
– The Fed says it will just put the losses on its balance sheet. They do not matter. It can always create money for its needs, however much it has lost
– The Bank of England says the Treasury/taxpayers have to reimburse it for all losses to avoid weakness on its balance sheet          -The ECB says 80% of the losses will be owned by the member states Central Banks, subordinate institutions under the ECB in the system of Euro area CBs.

Quantitative tightening (Slide 14)

Federal Reserve Board
-Took its balance sheet from $3.759 tn in August 2019 to a peak of $8.965 tn in April 2011. ( plus 138%)
-Now at $8.593 tn, up from $8.339 tn in March 2023.

European Central Bank
– Has an accumulated bond holding of Euro 3.23 tn under its Asset Purchase Programme, and Euro 1.71 tn under its Pandemic Purchase Programme.
– Balance sheet Euro 7.7 tn

Bank of England
– Reached a peak holding of £895bn. Added £450 bn over covid period.
– Ran down holdings by £38bn Feb to September 2022 from repayments. Now undertaking an £80 bn a year QT programme.
– Bank balance sheet current £1.05 tn

Bank of England inflation (Slide 15)
– May 2021 forecast 2% inflation in two years time if kept rates at 0.1% with Quantitative easing – outturn 10%
– May 2022 forecast 2% inflation in two years time with rates at 1% rising to 2.5%
– May 2023 forecast 2% inflation in two years time with rates at 4.5% and a major Quantitative tightening programme

Bank of England economic forecasts and models (Slide 16)
– The Bank sets out to predict inflation by forming a view of capacity in the economy and using a concept of capacity utilisation to assess whether the economy is running hot or cold. – – Unemployment is a crucial proxy for the judgement of capacity utilisation.
– The concept is based around the UK national economy. It finds it difficult to handle the international dimension in a very open economy which allows the UK to access global capacity for many items.
– It dos not take into account the impact on demand and prices of credit growth supplementing incomes.
– It fails to report or comment on money and credit growth